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In this dissertation I begin by discussing and evaluating various models for how 
people causally explain behavior in their everyday discourse. Using logical argument and 
empirical evidence I endorse a folk psychological model proposing that people explain 
intentional and unintentional actions differently. When a behavior is seen as being 
intentional it is usually explained by “reasons,” which specify the actor’s beliefs and/or 
desires that led to the intention to act. On the other hand, when a behavior is perceived to 
be unintentional it is predominantly explained by “causes,” which make reference to non-
psychological forces on the actor that bring about action directly, without being mediated 
by intention.  
In two studies I investigated 4- to 6-year-olds’ understanding of the relation 
between the intentionality of an action and the type of explanation used to explain it. 
Experiment 1 consisted of trials in which children were told about two protagonists 
performing the same action; one was explained with a reason, and the other with a cause. 
Children indicated which protagonist performed the act on purpose. Experiment 2 was 
the reverse; each trial consisted of one story about a protagonist who performed an 
 vii
intentional or unintentional action. Children chose between a reason and a cause 
explanation for the act. 
Overall, children performed significantly above chance level for both studies, but 
when age groups were considered separately only the two older groups’ performance 
exceeded chance.  This finding suggests that children begin to recognize the relation 
between action type and explanation type around the beginning of their sixth year, which 
is consistent with past studies showing related developments at that age.  
Performance on Experiment 1 was somewhat better than on Experiment 2, and 
only Experiment 1 showed an age effect. It is argued that these findings, combined with 
the fact that in Experiment 2 the “intentional” and the “unintentional” items were 
uncorrelated, suggest that two separate domains of knowledge – about the mind and 
about physical objects, with their separate characteristic modes of causation – become 
appropriated for the crucial task of explaining human behavior.  
 viii
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ..........................................................................................................x 
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1 
MODEL OF HOW WE EXPLAIN INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL 
BEHAVIOR...........................................................................................4 
Description.............................................................................................4 
Philosophers’ views ...............................................................................7 
How do we identify intention?.............................................................10 
Testing the model with adults ..............................................................11 
Arguments against Malle’s model .......................................................14 
RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN.................................................................20 
Preschoolers’ explanations...................................................................20 
Preschoolers’ explanations of behavior ...............................................23 
Children’s understanding of the relations among the components of 
intention ......................................................................................32 
Preschoolers’ understanding of intentional versus unintentional behavior
.....................................................................................................38 
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH ..........................................42 
EXPERIMENT 1 ..........................................................................................45 
Method .................................................................................................45 
Participants..................................................................................45 
Stimuli and Design......................................................................45 
Procedure ....................................................................................48 
Results and discussion .........................................................................51 
Responses to warm-up questions ................................................51 
Stories .........................................................................................52 
Test question (purpose judgments) .............................................52 




Stimuli and design.......................................................................56 
Procedure ....................................................................................58 
Results and discussion .........................................................................59 
Warm-up Questions ....................................................................59 
Stories .........................................................................................59 
Test Question ..............................................................................59 
“On purpose” versus “not on purpose” trials..............................60 
Correlation between trial types ...................................................61 
Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2....................................................62 
GENERAL DISCUSSION ...........................................................................63 
Summary of results ..............................................................................63 
The chronology of learning to explain behavior..................................63 
Reasoning about intentional and unintentional actions .......................67 







List of Figures 
Figure 1: Test question performance by age and experiment. ...............................54 




“Explanation is a river that flows through human life” 
(Wilson & Keil, 2000, p. 87) 
 
Imagine you’re tired and want to rest, so you sit down in a chair. Now imagine 
that a strong wind knocks you into a chair that happens to be behind you, leaving you in a 
sitting position. Despite appearing similar in some ways, these two actions are 
quintessentially different. In the first case, you had an intention to sit down before you 
actually did it. You believed that sitting would allow you to rest. You may have thought 
about which chair you wanted to sit in before choosing one. You may have deliberately 
looked behind you as you were sitting in the chair. In the latter case, you had no 
particular thoughts about sitting before ending up in a sitting position. You weren’t 
thinking about resting or about chairs. You did not take any deliberate action as you were 
sitting; it just happened. After ending up in a sitting position you were surprised, rather 
than feeling like you had accomplished your goal.  
These two types of behavior – intentional and unintentional behavior – do not 
only feel different. They are also treated differently by others. For example, the law 
recognizes this difference in its treatment of murder versus manslaughter, and intentional 
acts of helping and aggression are more likely to be reciprocated than are the same acts 
that are unintentional (Malle, 1999).   
This difference between intentional and unintentional behavior is a key aspect of a 
model of how we explain behavior, cited by a few attribution theorists and several 
philosophers (e.g., Buss, 1979; Heider, 1958; Malle, 1997, 1999; Malle, Moses, and 
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Baldwin, 2001; Searle, 1983). According to this model, we see intentional behavior as 
being generated by intentions, which in turn are generated by reasons (usually beliefs and 
desires), whereas we see unintentional behavior as being generated by causes, which 
usually generate behavior in some physical way. The model, therefore, can be 
represented as follows: reasons  intention  intentional behavior; causes  
unintentional behavior.  
The distinction between how reasons and causes generate behavior has been 
compared to Aristotle’s views of causality. Aristotle proposed four types of causality – 
material, formal, final, and efficient – the latter two of which correspond to reasons and 
causes. Aristotle’s “final cause,” which is “its function or the good it serves” is similar to 
a reason (in the example above, the “function” of sitting would be to rest).  In turn, his 
“efficient causality” is analogous to what we are calling “cause” (i.e., the wind that 
knocked us over) (Lloyd, 1995). 
The model described above, which is grounded in ancient philosophy, provides 
the framework for this paper. It has been tested and verified with adults (Malle, 1997, 
1999; White, 1991) – that is, it has shown to describe how people actually explain 
behavior – but has never, in its entirety, been tested with children. Therefore, although 
much research has been conducted that is relevant to certain parts of the model, we do not 
know whether children see reasons as generating intentional behavior and causes as 
generating unintentional behavior. 
First, I will expound on the model1 of how we explain intentional and 
unintentional behavior in more detail. Then I will present some different versions of the 
                                                 




model, as well as several criticisms that have been levied against it, arguing that Malle’s 
model can be supported both empirically and conceptually. Next, I review the research 
relevant to the question of whether, and to what extent, children’s folk reasoning can be 
described by the model.  
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MODEL OF HOW WE EXPLAIN INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL 
BEHAVIOR 
Description 
In a classic book, which is often said to have established the entire field of 
attribution theory, Heider (1958) developed the cause/reason dichotomy, in which 
explanations for intentional and unintentional behavior are seen as logically distinct. 
However, Heider did not use the labels of “reasons and causes;” rather, he used the terms 
“personal causality” and “impersonal causality.” His model, like the one endorsed in this 
paper, can be represented as “reasons  intentions  intentional action” and “causes  
unintentional behavior.” Though similar, his model was also different from Malle’s 
model (1997, 1999) in important ways, which we will see later.  
Heider’s idea of separating intentional from unintentional action in terms of how 
we explain behavior lay dormant for many years, until the seventies and the early 
eighties, when Buss (1978, 1979) as well as Locke and Pennington (1982) revived it. In 
arguing for the distinction between intentional and unintentional behavior, and between 
causes and reasons, Buss wrote that “causes and reasons are logically distinct categories 
for explaining different aspects of behavior.” Specifically, “causes are that which brings 
about a change,” whereas “reasons are that for which a change is brought about (e.g., 
goals, purposes, etc.)” (1978, p. 1311). Buss went on to argue that unintentional (or 
irrational) behavior tends to be explained by causes, whereas intentional behavior tends 
to be explained by reasons.  
Locke and Pennington (1982) similarly explained the difference between reasons 
and causes: “Whereas causes explain behavior by showing it to be the automatic or 
inevitable outcome of a certain complex of conditions in accordance with the relevant 
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laws of nature, reasons explain behavior by showing it to be what any rational agent 
would do, given the relevant beliefs and desires” (p. 213). They added that an agent 
always knows what his reasons are, but is not necessarily aware of the causes of his 
behavior.  
Buss’s (1978, 1979) and Locke and Pennington’s (1982) arguments were not 
sufficient to make a significant impact on the field, however. Attribution theorists have 
tended to, and still do, focus more on the distinction between “person explanations” and 
“situation explanations,” or “external” versus “internal” explanations for behavior (e.g., 
Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Shaver, 1975). For example, “she sneezed because of 
the pollen” would be a situation explanation, because it refers to something in her 
environment but not herself, whereas “she reached up because she wanted to open the 
cupboard” would be a person explanation because it refers to her and her desires. 
Although this dichotomy is similar to the reason/cause distinction, it does not map onto it 
directly.  
Recently, Malle (1997, 1999; Malle, et al., 2001) appealed to other attribution 
theorists to bring back the cause/reason distinction for explaining unintentional versus 
intentional behavior. As discussed before, his basic view of our folk-explanations of 
behavior is that causes directly influence behavior in some mechanical way without an 
intervening intention (e.g., sadness causes crying; sunshine causes happiness) (Malle, et 
al., 2001), whereas reasons are beliefs and desires that generate behavior via intention 
(e.g., He wanted to go to the store, and believed that driving there would help him get to 
the store, therefore he intended to drive). Thus, we explain intentional behavior with the 
beliefs and desires in light of which the intention was formed, and we explain 
unintentional behavior with generating factors that are not reasons and do not lead to an 
intention.  
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According to Malle (1997, 1999), although reasons usually appear as beliefs or 
desires, the words “want” and “think” don’t have to actually appear; these can be 
implicit, or “unmarked,” as in “I ran to catch the bus” instead of “I ran because I wanted 
to catch the bus.” Unmarked beliefs sometimes seem like they’re not beliefs at all, as in, 
“She went to the beach because it was sunny.” In this case it is her belief (i.e., her 
knowledge of the fact) that it was sunny that caused her to form an intention to go to the 
beach, not the sunniness itself. This example is a belief-reason, as opposed to a desire-
reason; Malle claimed that desire-reasons are the “primary motives of action” and are 
more common than belief reasons. 
Malle (1997, 1999; Malle, et al., 2001) clarified that while causes and reasons are 
the two main modes of explanation, there are also two minor modes: enabling factors, 
which clarify how the intention led to the action, such as “he ran a mile because he’s in 
good shape,” and causal history of reasons, which clarifies the factors that led to the 
reasons. Causal history of reasons is used when the observer is either ignorant of the 
actor’s mental states that led the actor to act, as in, “I don’t know why he said that, weird 
people do these kinds of things” (p. 276), or when the observer wishes to express a whole 
class of reasons, as in “I go to the supermarket every day because I have three kids” (p. 
277). It is not having three kids that actually causes the speaker to go to the supermarket; 
rather, having three kids instigates other, more immediate reasons (e.g., “I’d like to get 
some diapers, and going to the store is the best way of achieving that aim”), perhaps 
different ones each time he goes. 
It was said earlier that the cause/reason distinction is not in vogue in attribution 
theory. Indeed, to my knowledge only one attribution theorist’s views were sufficiently 
similar to Malle’s (1997; 1999) to include in the discussion of his theory. Nevertheless, 
views of commonsense psychology similar to his have been alive and well within 
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philosophy for some years. I now turn to the views of these philosophers, along with the 
one relevant attribution theorist, White (1991), pointing out where they agree with the 
model and where they propose ideas that refine the model.  
Philosophers’ views 
Like attribution theorists Malle (1997, 1999; Malle, et al., 2001) and White 
(1991), philosophers Lennon (1990) and Dretske (1988) maintained that intentional 
actions are explained in terms of purpose or reasons, whereas unintentional acts are 
explained by antecedent causes: “Crucially,” Lennon explained, with intentional acts “we 
are seeking to understand the point or purpose of the activity from the agent’s point of 
view,” whereas “we do not expect [an unintentional action’s] explanation to differ 
fundamentally from that offered for other natural phenomena – for example, one billiard 
ball hitting another and causing it to move” (p. 16). Similarly, White wrote, “the basic 
distinction . . . is between behavior seen as conscious, voluntary, and intentional and 
explained in terms of reasons, and behavior seen as unconscious and deterministic, and 
explained in terms of causes other than reasons” (p. 261). 
Woodfield (1976), who expounded on the explanation of intentional behavior, 
explicated the meaning of the common form of explanation “X did Y in order to Z”: 
“Mary wants to go shopping in order to buy a present” means “Mary wants to go 
shopping because she wants to buy a present and believes that going shopping will 
contribute to buying a present” (p. 217). Here we have both a desire (wants to buy a 
present) and belief (that going shopping will help her buy the present). We can think of 
this as Mary intending to go shopping, and the intention is formed in light of the relevant 
desire and belief. 
Probably the philosopher most known for his views on the intentionality of 
behavior is Searle (1983). Although quite complex, his basic philosophy of behavior was 
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very similar to that of Malle (1997, 1999). He agreed that intentional behavior is 
fundamentally different from unintentional behavior, and that an intention to do X results 
from a desire for A, as well as a belief that action X will result in A. Searle used a slightly 
different lexicon from Malle, however. He called unintentional acts simply “bodily 
movements” but intentional acts “actions.” To illustrate the difference between bodily 
movements and actions he contrasted two ways of generating a hand movement: 
stimulating an electrode planted in the motor cortex of one hemisphere of the brain, and 
voluntarily moving one’s hand. “There is an obvious phenomenal difference between the 
case where one moves one’s hand and the case where one observes it move 
independently of one’s intentions…Such concepts as ‘trying’, ‘succeeding’, and ‘failing’ 
apply to it in ways that they do not apply to the experiences the patient has when he 
simply observes his hand moving” (p. 90). 
Searle (1983) clarified several aspects of the basic model of explanation and 
intentionality. One is that in order for someone to do something intentionally, the 
intention actually has to generate the action; the behavior cannot come about in some 
other way. For example, Searle argued, if someone intended to kill his uncle, then drove 
so recklessly that he inadvertently hit a pedestrian who happened to be his uncle, his 
killing his uncle would not be considered intentional. Thus, it is not enough to have an 
intention that matches the outcome; the two have to be causally related. 
Searle (1983) also introduced the idea that the intention does not have to be prior 
to the action; it can be an “intention-in-action.” When we switch gears while driving, for 
example, we may not have thought beforehand, “I’m going to switch gears.” 
Nevertheless, switching gears is intentional because we have the intention in some sense 
while the action is happening.  
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Another of Searle’s (1983) ideas about the issue was that sometimes the action is 
a non-action, as when one intends to hold still or to refrain from doing something. 
Refraining from performing an action is not itself a behavior or an action, nonetheless it 
is something we can think about doing beforehand and that can result from our beliefs, 
desires, and intentions. In this sense, the absence of behavior is intentional. 
Davidson (1963) did not deal with unintentional behavior, but he discussed 
intentional behavior in detail. His model was basically the same as Malle’s (1997, 1999, 
Malle, et al., 2001), but he added that sometimes we perform actions that are intentional 
under one description but not under another. To illustrate his point, he explains that when 
we turn on the light we are also illuminating the room, flipping the switch, and 
inadvertently alerting a prowler that we are home. Here we are not doing four things, but 
only one, of which four descriptions have been given. The behavior is intentional under 
some descriptions, but unintentional under others. 
Malle’s (1997, 1999) model of our explanation of behavior can also be refined by 
considering that reasons consist of both a desire and a belief, but one can often be 
inferred from the other. For example, I can explain that I left this morning at 8:30 because 
I wanted to get to work on time. One can infer from this statement of desire that I also 
believed that leaving at that time would allow me to get to work on time. The opposite is 
also true – if I say that I left for work at 8:30 because I thought that doing so would allow 
me to be on time for work, it can be inferred that I also want to get to work on time, that I 
believe such an outcome to be desirable. 
It should be mentioned that like most psychological models Malle’s (1997, 1999) 
model of how we explain behavior should not be considered absolute; it should be seen 
as capturing how we usually explain behavior, not how behavior must be explained, 
neither in the sense of natural law nor logical necessity. In fact, it is easy to come up with 
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exceptions to the model. One example of unintentional behavior being described by 
reasons is when we explain unintentional bodily functions in terms of their purpose for 
the body as a whole. That is, one could say that human beings sweat in order to cool 
themselves. (Bodily functions are often explained in terms of reasons because the concept 
of evolution tends to be misconstrued as perhaps a semi-intentional force that designs 
species to maximize survival.)   
Also, causes can sometimes be mental states, but are not the mental states in light 
of which the intention is formed and the action is performed. Consider the example, “She 
put salt in her coffee because she thought it was sugar.” Here, the explanation for the 
mistake contains a mental state. However, assume that pouring salt was the action, having 
sweet coffee was the desired outcome, and jar A contains salt. She did not decide to pour 
salt in light of her false belief that it was sugar. In fact, she could not have done anything 
in light of her false belief because she wasn’t aware that her belief was false.  
How do we identify intention? 
Next I turn briefly to the question of how we know whether behavior is 
intentional or unintentional. How do adults make that distinction? In addition to Malle 
(1997) this question has been addressed by a few authors working in the “theory of mind” 
field in psychology, which tackles issues regarding children’s understanding of both their 
own and others’ minds. 
There are many ways of distinguishing between intentional and unintentional 
behavior. For example, if the behavior itself is witnessed, one can often tell by 
determining whether or not the actor is looking at or aware of what she is doing (Malle, 
1997). Also, one can judge whether the outcome is likely given the actor’s skill in the 
particular behavior. If the actor is considered to be unable to perform a particular 
behavior, the behavior and the outcome will be seen to be unintentional, or by chance. 
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For example, if someone is goofing around, flings a dart towards the board and hits the 
bullseye, the outcome is not considered to be intentional, but rather driven by chance. 
Most importantly, intentional actions have a certain “look” to them showing the actor to 
be careful, directed, and coordinated in his or her actions. If the action is merely 
described, one can often make the distinction according to the verb used. As pointed out 
by Astington (1999), intentionality is deeply entrenched in our language. For instance, 
some verbs inherently imply intentionality and others non-intentionality. The verb “die” 
is non-agentive and implies non-intentionality whereas “murder” is agentive and implies 
intentionality.  
As discussed by Wellman and Phillips (2001), our reactions toward the result of 
an action can also be a clue to its intentionality. When we do something intentionally we 
look happy at the success of an action, and if we fail we might say something like “oops” 
or “darn.” These examples imply that the person was trying to achieve some action. Even 
14- to 18-month-old infants show an understanding of vocal cues to intentionality or non-
intentionality by imitating actions accompanied by “there!” but not actions accompanied 
by “oops” (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 2000). Also, when someone does something 
unintentionally they might look surprised or make an utterance denoting surprise, like 
“oh.” 
Testing the model with adults 
The reason I am endorsing Malle’s (1997, 1999) model for how we explain 
behavior is not simply that similar views are popular with philosophers. Rather, the 
model has been tested empirically in adults, by Malle himself as well as by White (1991). 
The basic model has been verified, but as yet many of the details and refinements have 
not been addressed empirically.  
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In two straightforward studies, Malle (1999) demonstrated that people tend to 
explain unintentional behavior with mere causes, and intentional behavior with reasons. 
In the first study he was interested in showing that when people encounter a reason 
explanation for a behavior, they will tend to see the behavior as intentional, but when 
they encounter a cause explanation for the same behavior, they will see it as 
unintentional. He presented to participants two behaviors that were ambiguous as to 
intentionality (driving above the speed limit and interrupting one’s mother) and 
explanations that were either reason explanations (e.g., she wanted to get to the store 
before six, or she knew the store closed at six) or cause explanations (e.g., she wasn’t 
paying attention to the speedometer, or the speedometer didn’t work). Participants rated 
how intentional they thought each behavior was on a nine-point scale. As hypothesized, 
participants rated the behavior as much more intentional when it was explained with a 
reason explanation than when it was explained with a cause explanation. 
The second study was the reverse of the first one in that Malle (1999) tested the 
hypothesis that when people are asked to explain an unintentional behavior, they will 
offer cause explanations, but when they are asked to explain an intentional behavior, they 
will offer reason explanations. Participants were presented with twenty behaviors, and 
they rated the intentionality of the behaviors and gave explanations for them. The 
explanations were then coded for being causes or reasons. For example, “the speedometer 
broke” was coded as a cause of speeding, whereas “she wanted to get to the store” was 
coded as a reason. The results were again in favor of the model – intentionality ratings 
correlated strongly with reason explanations. That is, behaviors that tended to be seen as 
intentional also tended to be explained with reason explanations, and vice versa. 
In a study very similar to Malle’s (1999) Study 1, White (1991) had participants 
rate behaviors with reason explanations and cause explanations attached. They rated the 
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behaviors as being “conscious” or “unconscious” as well as “intentional” or 
“unintentional.” The behaviors explained with reasons were judged to be conscious and 
intentional, whereas the behaviors explained by causes were seen as being unconscious 
and unintentional.  
In a series of four studies, Malle (1997) addressed the intentional aspect of the 
model – its reasons  intentions  behavior component. In Study 1, adults rated 
behaviors as being intentional or unintentional. Some participants were asked to make 
their intentionality judgments from the actor’s perspective, and others were asked to 
make the judgments from the observer’s perspective. Both groups had access to the same 
information. Agreement was high both across and within conditions. This study provides 
evidence that actors and observers agree on intentionality and therefore that intentionality 
is a shared concept, not dependent on the perspective from which people are judging or 
on who is doing the judging. 
Study 2 (Malle, 1997) explored adults’ notions of intentionality. Participants 
explained in their own words what it means to do something intentionally. Ninety-six 
percent (of the 87% who did not give mere synonyms for intention) mentioned beliefs, 
desires, or intention, or some combination of these, as well as the awareness of doing the 
behavior while it is being done.  
In Study 3, Malle (1997) tested people’s opinions about whether skill in a 
particular behavior is necessary in order to judge a behavior to be intentional. One of the 
two scenarios in the studies involved a man who had been practicing throwing a penny 
such that it always lands on tails. However, he hasn’t been able to succeed in getting tails 
at more than chance level (skill absent).  The test question was, “Do you think X 
achieved outcome Y intentionally?” The results indicated that skill was indeed necessary. 
People tended to see unskilled performance of a behavior requiring skill, such as biasing 
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a coin throw or succeeding in a particularly difficult combination shot, as happening by 
chance. It should be noted that skill is only relevant to certain types of behaviors; for 
most behaviors, such as going to the store, skill is not an issue. 
Finally, in Study 4 (Malle, 1997) the self-awareness of one’s actions was 
manipulated, and adults were asked whether the behaviors were intentional. That is, for 
some of the behaviors that were presented the actors were aware of what they were doing 
while they were doing it, whereas for other behaviors they were not. Awareness was 
deemed to be necessary for intentionality of behavior. For example, Frank’s bumping into 
George’s car was seen to be accidental if Frank didn’t know he had bumped into the car. 
Arguments against Malle’s model 
Although views similar to Malle’s (1997; 1999) model have appeared within 
philosophy for many years, they have not escaped criticism. Also, several versions of the 
model have been proposed that differ from Malle’s in important ways. In the next section 
I will address arguments against the model (and against similar models that have been 
proposed over the years), and discuss the differing versions of the model. 
One criticism that has been levied is that the cause/reason distinction is not a true 
dichotomy, or not a useful one. Kruglanski (1979), for example, argued that because 
cause and reason both bring about change in an “antecedent-consequent” relation (p. 
1448) and do so in a lawful and predictable way, the two types of explanation are not 
sufficiently distinct to make the dichotomy useful. It is true that an intention occurs 
before the action, just as a cause does, even though the content of an intention refers to 
the future (e.g., “I want to eat to feel sated”). His claim that both cause and reason bring 
about their changes in a lawful way refers to the fact that when people intend to do things 
they usually do them. Rarely does an obstacle impede the intention  behavior relation. 
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Thus, in Kruglanski’s (1979) terms, “there is nothing unique about classifying 
explanations into causes and reasons.” (p. 1453) Reasons are simply one kind of 
generating factor, and causes are generating factors that are non-reasons. According to 
him, the reason-cause distinction may be compared to the possible distinctions between 
any of the infinite explanatory categories and their complements, such as mechanical 
versus monmechanical explanations, biological versus nonbiological explanations, and so 
forth. 
Kruglanski’s claim (1979) that reasons and causes are both antecedent-consequent 
generating factors is true. However, this fact does not lead to his conclusion. First, any 
generating factor by definition comes before the effect. Further, that does not mean the 
distinction is arbitrary. The most important difference is that reasons refer to mental 
states, goals, and purposes, whereas causes usually refer to some physical aspect of the 
situation without referring to mental states. They refer to fundamentally different kinds of 
causality (mental versus physical). 
In addition, cause and reason, when used as explanations, demarcate intentional 
from unintentional behavior, which as argued earlier is a fundamental distinction. 
Moreover, as pointed out by several authors (Buss, 1979; Harre & Secord, 1972; Taylor, 
1964), cause and reason are logically distinct. Reasons have “representational content” (I 
want to take a walk), but causes do not. In other words, we do not just desire and believe; 
there is content to our desires and beliefs. We desire and believe something (Schueler, 
2001). Another way in which causes and reasons are logically distinct is that one could, 
in principle, explain the exact physical mechanism whereby a cause generates a behavior 
(e.g., if one knew enough about biology one could describe precisely how hitting a knee 
with a hammer causes the leg to move); in contrast, we have no idea what intentions are, 
neurologically, nor how they lead to behavior, and it is likely that it is inexplicable, at 
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least with the sciences we have today. Thus, cause and reason are conceptually distinct; 
one cannot be deduced from the other (Taylor, 1964).  
A similar argument was proposed by Harvey and Tucker (1979). Their quarrel 
was not with the cause/reason distinction but with the intentional/unintentional 
distinction. They contended that the distinction was ambiguous because there are 
behaviors that one cannot say are truly intentional or unintentional, such as 
manifestations of emotionality, like smiling. Along the same lines, they suggested that it 
would be possible for a behavior to be started unconsciously, but then finished 
intentionally. 
Harvey and Tucker (1979) were saying, in essence, that the distinction between 
intentional and unintentional behavior is invalid because there are in-between cases that 
do not quite fit in one category or the other, that cannot be said to be definitely intentional 
nor unintentional. However, the existence of in-between cases does not render the 
distinction invalid; there are many useful distinctions in psychology for which there are 
in-between cases. For example, in learning theory we distinguish between operant and 
classical conditioning, yet discriminant learning could be described as involving either 
operant or classical conditioning, depending on which aspect is being emphasized. Also, 
Shwitzgebel (1999) expounded on the idea that there are in-between cases of belief, cases 
in which one would not be correct to say either that one definitely believes something or 
definitely does not believe it. Clearly, this does not mean that belief is an invalid or 
useless concept. By the same token, in-between cases do not make the 
intentional/unintentional distinction invalid or useless. 
A further argument relates to the idea that reasons are always inside the person, 
whereas causes are outside the person. When Heider (1958) wrote his seminal book on 
the explanation of behavior, he not only made the cause/reason distinction, but he argued 
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that the inside/outside the person dichotomy mapped onto it. It is the inside/outside 
distinction that was retained in mainstream attribution theory; in fact, it often seems to be 
confused with the reason/cause distinction. For example, Lalljee, Watson, and White 
(1983), in a study in which children gave explanations for intentional and unintentional 
behavior, first wrote about reasons/causes as differentiating intentional from 
unintentional behavior, then seemed to equate reasons with “person” (inside) 
explanations and causes with “situational” (outside the person) explanations. The 
explanations were coded into person/situational factors. 
Although I agree that reasons are in an important sense internal to the person, as 
they are mental states, I contend that the person/situational factor distinction should be 
discarded and replaced by the reason/cause dichotomy, untainted by concern with 
whether explanations are personal or situational. As Malle (1999) has argued, the 
person/situational dichotomy ignores unintentional behavior that is caused by person 
factors. For example, if I shiver and explain the behavior by saying “because I am cold” 
the explanation would be considered a “person factor.” Shivering is unintentional, 
however, and being cold is not a reason, it is a cause. For this reason, although the 
person/situation distinction is often treated as though it demarcates intentional from 
unintentional behavior, it actually tends to obliterate the intentional/unintentional 
distinction when it is used in research. As argued by Malle (2001), it “fails to 
acknowledge the central role that people’s concept of intentionality plays in shaping their 
explanations of behavior” (p. 265).  
Further, when authors code explanations in terms of internal/external features 
they tend to make the distinction based on surface features of the explanations. For 
example, “She went because her mom was there” would be coded as external (because it 
mentions her mother and not herself) whereas “she went because she thought her mom 
 18
was there” would be coded as internal. The explanations are paraphrases of each other, 
and should both be coded as reasons (because they both are about her belief), yet in one 
study they were coded by attribution theorists as different types of explanations (Malle, 
2001). Another example was provided by White (1991) in making the same point: “I 
want to make a lot of money” and “chemistry is a high-paying field” (p. 260) as 
explanations for choosing chemistry as a career path would be coded as internal and 
external respectively, even though they are both reasons and both explain an intentional 
behavior. 
In fact, White (1991) showed empirically that the intentional/unintentional 
distinction does not map onto the internal/external distinction. In a study in which 
participants rated explanations for intentionality as well as whether they were internal or 
external, the two distinctions did not correlate. Thus, the two distinctions should not be 
considered interchangeable, as they often are. 
A final difference between Malle’s model and contrasting versions of it pertains 
to the question of whether actors and observers differ in their explanations. Buss (1978) 
addressed this issue in his attempt to bring the cause/reason distinction back into the 
field. His claim was that intentional behavior is explained by the actor using reasons, 
whereas it is explained by the observer using either reasons or causes. Similarly, Locke & 
Pennington (1982) suggested that for intentional behavior, actors tend to give reasons, 
whereas observers tend to give causes. Both Buss and Locke and Pennington maintained 
that unintentional behavior is explained by causes. The difference is that while Locke and 
Pennington believed that observers tend to give causes for intentional behavior, Buss’ 
view was that observers can give either reasons or causes for intentional behavior. 
Buss’s (1978, 1979) and Locke and Pennington’s (1982) claim that unintentional 
behavior is explained by causes is uncontroversial. However, as shown by Malle (1999; 
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Malle et al., 2001), observers and actors do not actually differ in their explanations. I 
agree that intentional actions are sometimes explained by what seem to be “causes;” 
however, many of these “causes” are what Malle (1997) termed “causal history of 
reasons” (Davidson, 1963, discusses this as well). For example, if Mary robs a bank, you 
might cite her poor background in your explanation of her behavior, as opposed to her 
reasons for doing so (e.g., wanting money and believing that robbing a bank is a good 
way to get money). However, Mary’s poor background shaped her beliefs and desires, 
which led to her behavior. Thus, what you are really doing is giving the causal history of 
her beliefs and desires, not explaining the action itself. Also, this type of explanation is 
not limited to observers; to use the previous example, Mary herself could cite her own 
poor background to explain her behavior. 
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RESEARCH WITH CHILDREN 
Much research has been conducted both on children’s explanations and on their 
understanding of intention. However, the two areas rarely meet in research, and never has 
the question of whether children explain intentional behavior with reasons and 
unintentional behavior with causes been addressed in a valid way. Nonetheless, 
examining the research on these separate areas provide the background and context of the 
present experiments. 
I limit my review to studies that include young children, as research suggests that 
important milestones in both explanation/causality and the understanding of intention are 
reached between 3 andd 5 years of age. 
Preschoolers’ explanations 
First I will review the literature on preschoolers’ explanations to give a sense of 
what these children’s explanations, in general, are like. Then I will explore the more 
pertinent issue of how preschoolers explain human behavior. 
One study by Callanan and Oakes (1992) shows the kinds of explanations 
children receive at home. They conducted a diary study in which for two weeks mothers 
wrote down the “why” and “how” questions asked by their preschool children as well as 
the explanations that ensued in response. Explanations were coded into “prior cause” and 
“consequence.” These two types of explanation correspond roughly to causes and 
reasons; for example, “I moved my leg because someone pushed it” would be coded as 
“prior cause” in this coding scheme, and as “cause” in Malle’s (1997, 1999) model. On 
the other hand, “I moved my leg so I could kick someone” would be a “consequence” in 
this coding scheme, and a reason in Malle’s model. It was found that children were 
receiving both types of explanations, but that the prior cause explanations were more 
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frequent than the consequence explanations. The fact that children receive both types of 
explanation at home bodes well for their ability to supply their own explanations. 
In a naturalistic study looking at preschoolers’ own explanations (McCabe & 
Peterson, 2001), their spontaneous speech was analyzed for correct uses of the causal 
connectives “because” and “so.” Surprisingly, preschoolers (4- to 6-year-olds) made no 
more errors (such as reversing cause and effect, as in “I am cold because I want to go 
inside”) than did adults, suggesting that children are adept at the causal form (X because 
Y, Y so X, etc.). Also, participants of all ages used the causal connectives more for 
psychological causality than for physical causality. Perhaps because other people are so 
important in our lives children learn to talk about them with sophistication, using the 
causal words “because” and “so”, before they learn this skill with objects. 
In a similar but longitudinal study (Hood & Bloom, 1979), naturalistic speech was 
collected from 2- to 3-year-old children for a period of 17 months, and was analyzed for 
various aspects of causal utterances (ones that include “why” or “how” in a causal way, 
that are responses to causal questions, or that otherwise imply a causal relationship 
between clauses). Included in the findings was a substantial increase over time in causal 
utterances in general, suggesting that as children reach preschool age they are becoming 
more interested in and adept at causal explanation. In addition, the earliest responses to 
adults’ causal questions were unintelligible, but the frequency of causally interpretable 
responses increased markedly over the 17-month period. Further, the children’s first 
causal statements did not include the connectives “because” or “so,” but the proportion of 
statements with connectives increased as the children reached preschool age. In addition, 
as in the McCabe and Peterson (2001) study errors in the use of “because” and “so” were 
rare. Also consistent with that study, children tended to talk about psychological 
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causality, using explanations that included intentions and motives, more than about 
physical causality. 
Following Piaget’s research on artificialism, Gelman and Kremer (1991) explored 
preschoolers’ explanations for the origins of natural phenomena, such as the ocean and 
dirt, as well as the origins of artifacts. Four- to 5-year-olds were asked if people were 
responsible for the phenomena, then were asked “How?” or “Why not?”. Responses were 
scored as “naturalistic” (coming from nature, from a living thing, from an animate natural 
process such as growth, or from an inanimate natural process) or “nonnaturalistic” (all 
other responses). Results showed that when the preschoolers were asked, “How?” or 
“Why not?” they gave naturalistic responses only for natural kinds, never for artifacts.  
For our purposes, the important finding is that the children responded appropriately to the 
causal queries, varying their explanations according to the phenomenon in question.  
Two conclusions can be drawn from these studies. First, preschoolers are 
interested in causality and explanation, as evidenced by the frequency of their causal 
utterances; they are starting to use causal explanation in their own speech even before the 
beginning of their preschool years. Second, the findings suggest that by four years of age 
children can reliably answer open-ended “why” questions with causal responses 
(although the quality or correctness of the explanations might be lacking). Note that 
responding causally is not the only way children could answer a causal question – they 
could merely repeat the question or respond with a non-causal aspect of the situation, or 
say nothing at all. But they do not do this. Responding causally is quite an achievement, 
as it has only been 3 years since these children began talking at all.  
Not only can they respond to open-ended “why” questions, but preschoolers can 
also choose the most sensible explanation out of several choices. In four studies (Springer 
& Keil, 1991), preschoolers chose among different types of explanation for why flowers 
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are pink, why some dogs are brown, and why some cans are red. For color acquisition, 
preschoolers rejected “silly” explanations such as “a little man came along with a 
paintbrush, opened the seed carefully, and painted it pink” (p. 770) and “the mother 
flower wanted her baby to be pink just like her” (p.772) for the biological kinds, and “the 
machine wanted the can to be red just like the other cans” (p. 779) for the artifacts, in 
favor of biological explanations for the biological kinds and human intention 
explanations for the artifacts. 
In addition to showing that preschoolers can distinguish between reasonable and 
unreasonable mechanisms for color acquisition, this study suggests that preschoolers can 
systematically choose appropriate explanations for “why” questions from among several 
options. More broadly, these studies on children’s explanations suggest that children use 
causal language in their natural speech, and that this increases from 2 years old to at least 
4, as well as that preschoolers can choose reasonable causal explanations out of several 
choices. 
Preschoolers’ explanations of behavior   
With the exception of Kalish (1998), none of the following studies deal with the 
cause/reason distinction, or Malle’s (1997, 1999) model of the explanation of human 
behavior, per se. However, several address certain parts of the model and give us a 
general idea of how preschoolers explain other people’s behavior. 
Probably the most basic question with regard to young children’s explanations of 
behavior concerns their ability to explain actions with reference to mental states when the 
actor’s desire is clear and the action is obviously intentional. In a classic study, Bartsch 
and Wellman (1989) showed that 3-and 4-year-olds indeed possess this ability. The 
authors invoked explanations for intended action (e.g., “Jane is looking under the piano 
for her kitten. Why do you think Jane is doing that?”) (p. 949) from 3- and 4-year-olds as 
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well as adults. The authors coded the responses for psychological reasoning (beliefs and 
desires). Both children and adults appealed to beliefs and desires in their explanations for 
behavior (as opposed to physical or behaviorist responses, etc.). This study speaks to the 
intentional part of the model, in which beliefs and desires are seen to play a causal role in 
behavior. Although it does not address young children’s knowledge of the cause/reason 
distinction or their knowledge about intention as a mental state, it shows that even 3-year-
olds know that when a person wants something and performs an action that could lead to 
achieving it, the behavior is explained in terms of the desire for the outcome or the belief 
that the action will lead to the desired outcome.   
This finding, coupled with research cited above showing that children employ 
physical causality to explain non-human events, raises the question of how children 
decide which type of causality to use in their explanations of events in general (e.g., 
human behavior as well as natural or mechanical events). Proponents of the most 
prominent proposal, the “entity” view of explanation, claim that young children think of 
each kind of entity as having its own type of causality (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994). For 
instance, Carey and Spelke proposed that children regard people solely in terms of goals, 
feelings, and other psychological states, and that they regard inanimate objects in terms 
of non-intentional, physical causality. Whereas preschoolers’ treatment of inanimate 
objects and events has not been addressed systematically, the studies discussed below 
show that children can be flexible in their explanations of human behavior. Young 
children seem to recognize that the same type of entity (people, in this case) can be 
reasoned about in different ways; in addition to intentional beings people are also bodies 
moving through space and obeying the causal laws of other physical objects. 
Before presenting evidence suggesting that children’s explanations of human 
behavior is flexible, I should point out that his flexibility is necessary in order to explain 
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behavior in terms of both reasons and causes. In fact some awareness that non-mental 
forces influence behavior is probably necessary for much younger children as well, 
though not necessarily in the form of verbal explanations. If we thought of every 
movement or action exclusively in terms of purposes, beliefs, and desires, our experience 
of the social world would be radically different. Attempting to explain or predict 
behaviors such as falling down, breaking a favorite glass, or snoring would be perplexing 
if they were believed to be purposeful. Such a belief would lead to the view that people 
are irrational beings with obscure, conflicting desires and odd ways of obtaining desired 
outcomes2. For this reason it is unlikely that children possess a pure “entity” view at any 
point in development, and it is not surprising that researchers tend to find explanatory 
flexibility in regard to human behavior. 
In one study providing evidence against the entity view, Hickling and Wellman 
(2001) coded children’s speech from CHILDES database of natural child language for 
causal utterances. Their main goal was to determine what kinds of things young children 
(2.5- to 5-years-old) explain and how children link explanation types to entity types. The 
explanations were divided into 6 categories: physical, psychological, social-conventional, 
biological, behavioral and magical. The results showed that children produced more 
physical explanations than any other kind, but that people were most often explained. 
                                                 
2 Our social experience would be analogous to that of Fune, a character in a story by Borges, who as 
the result of falling off a horse acquired the unfortunate ability to process and remember events in 
minute detail and lost the crucial ability to parse these details into discrete, meaningful events. He 
viewed each “action,” such as the twitching of a lip or the plunge of a dagger into an abdomen, as 
equally salient and memorable. In Fune’s words, the sum of his experiences and memories is “like a 
garbage disposal” (Borges, 1967). 
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(The authors do not specify what aspects of people the children were explaining; 
behavior? Appearance? General tendencies?) The authors concluded that young children 
“explained people” not just in psychological terms (e.g., “the man wants to eat”), but also 
in physical, biological, and social-conventional terms (e.g., a biological explanation 
might be, “the man is fat because he ate food”). 
This study shows that 1) children are interested in and knowledgeable about 
causality, 2) in particular, they’re interested in people’s behavior, and 3) they explain 
human behavior not just in psychological terms, but in other terms as well: “Children 
explain intentional, goal-directed action in psychological terms but more passive, object-
like movements in physical terms” (Hickling & Wellman, 2001; p. 677). However, it is 
difficult to interpret Hickling and Wellman’s data specifically in terms of the question of 
whether children explain intentional behavior using reasons and unintentional behavior 
using causes, because the data are not coded in these terms. It might seem that the 
authors’ judgments of psychological versus physical explanations would map onto 
reasons and causes, and in some cases they do. For example, “I talking very quiet because 
I don’t want somebody to wake me up” (p. 678) was coded as psychological and would 
be coded as a reason in the reason/cause framework. “I pushed it because I got knocked 
down” (p. 678) was coded as physical and would be a cause in the reasons/causes 
framework.  
However, it is not always the case that their physical/psychological dichotomy 
maps onto the cause/reason distinction. For example, the utterance, “I can’t step on the 
binoculars because they will break apart” (p. 679) was coded as physical (the justification 
being that binoculars breaking focuses on a mechanical force), whereas it would be 
considered a reason under the reason/cause framework because it implies a belief (that 
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they will break apart) in light of which the decision not to step on the binoculars was 
formed.  
Other research questioning the entity view of explanation includes a series of 
studies by Schult and Wellman (1997). The purpose of their research was to determine 
whether 3- and 4-year-olds explain different sorts of human actions (caused by 
psychological states, physical forces, or biological processes) in different and appropriate 
ways. In the first study the children explained voluntary actions, mistakes, physically-
caused and biologically-caused behaviors. The 4-year-olds, but not the 3-year-olds, gave 
psychological explanations for the voluntary actions and mistakes and gave physical and 
biological explanations for the other two types.  
This sounds very much like it tests whether children’s explanations conform to 
Malle’s (1997, 1999) model of explaining behavior. However, although the authors 
acknowledged that mistakes, physically-caused and biologically-caused behaviors were 
all unintended, they did not analyze the data in a way that takes this into account (i.e., 
they did not combine these categories). Also, it may seem that the psychological/physical 
dichotomy in this study maps onto the reasons/causes dichotomy in our framework, but 
this is not the case. Several of the examples cited in the article were coded in a way that 
belies this mapping. For example, for one mistake story in which a character accidentally 
pours ketchup on his ice cream, a child responded, “She just didn’t know it was ketchup” 
(p. 297). This was coded as a psychological explanation, yet according to Malle’s model 
the false belief directly causes her to pour ketchup  without an intervening intention to do 
so.  
Although this response makes references to beliefs and desires, the character’s 
lack of knowledge would be a cause under the reasons/causes framework because the 
character did not desire to pour ketchup. The character’s false belief led directly to her 
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pouring ketchup without an intervening intention to do so. Further, pouring ketchup could 
easily be construed as the outcome instead of the action. According to this perspective 
reaching for a bottle (which she incorrectly took for chocolate sauce) would be the action 
and it would be intentional. Thus, the data support the claim that young preschoolers can 
shift from one type of explanation to another depending on the action, but the findings do 
not support a conclusion that children easily and appropriately shift from reason to cause 
explanations depending on the intentionality of action.  
In a pilot study, the authors had tried telling stories and asking 3-year-olds for 
explanations, but children’s responses were mostly incomprehensible or “don’t know,” or 
the children changed the story so that the outcome matched the desire. Neither this nor 
any of the studies on children’s general explanations mentioned so far have shown that 3-
year-olds can express explanations of given behaviors, so it remains possible that as 
Schult (2002) concludes, “3-year-olds in general are not good explainers” (Schult, 2002, 
p.1739). 
Because of the difficulty eliciting causal responses from 3-year-olds, in a second 
study the authors (Schult & Wellman, 1997) elicited yes/no judgments by 3- and 4-year-
olds as to whether people who want to perform certain impossible actions can perform 
those actions (e.g., float in the air, stay awake forever). The children responded 
appropriately, which was interpreted by the authors as indicating that even 3-year-olds’ 
explanations refute the entity view by showing that people’s actions are constrained by 
physical and biological forces. However, the understanding that people cannot violate 
physical laws is only one small component of the ability to explain actual actions with 
regard to physical forces.  
A study by Kalish (1998) comes the closest of all the studies discussed so far to 
testing whether preschoolers conform to the reason/cause model of how we explain 
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behavior. However, as we see later, the coding scheme does not match the causes/reasons 
distinction, and the questions are about why people do not do things rather than why 
people do things. The aim of the study was to investigate children’s understanding of the 
distinction between social rules (voluntary conformity) and physical laws (automatic 
conformity). The author presented 3- and 4-year-old children with stories about people 
who wanted to perform actions that would violate each type of law. They were queried 
about whether the characters could perform the actions, then were asked, “How?” or 
“Why not?” Responses were coded in terms of reasons versus causes. Causes were 
generally physical limitations (e.g., “he’s not tall enough to touch the ceiling”) whereas 
reasons referred to social injunctions (e.g., “his parents won’t let him”) or to adverse 
consequences of performing the action (e.g., “he would ruin his shoes”) (p. 709).  
Kalish found that many of the children’s justifications were coded as neutral 
(neither cause nor reason), but of the justifications that were coded as either reasons or 
causes more of them were cause than reason explanations for the physical laws, and for 
social rules the 4-year-olds (but not the 3-year-olds) gave more reason than cause 
explanations. These data suggest that children use both causes and reasons in their 
explanations in a systematic way. Because following physical laws does not require 
intention, whereas following social laws usually does, these data seem quite suggestive 
that children adhere to our model of how we explain behavior. 
Although it is encouraging that a developmental psychologist is making uses of 
the reason/cause dichotomy, there are a few limitations in this study that somewhat 
undermine the conclusions. First, the 3-year-olds gave few explanations that were reasons 
or causes – for the physical stories fewer than half were coded as one or the other. This 
makes the data somewhat difficult to interpret. More importantly, the coding did not quite 
follow the traditional cause/reason framework. For example, possible negative 
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consequences were coded as reasons (e.g. “his shoes would get wet [if he took a bath 
with his clothes on]”) (p. 712). However, this should only count as a reason if the boy 
was aware of this consequence and decided not to take a bath in light of this knowledge. 
There is no indication that this line of reasoning took place.  
Similarly, statements like “his parents wouldn’t let him” (p. 709) were coded as 
reasons, whereas it is possible that the children were thinking that his parents were 
physically stopping him from performing the action, as opposed to providing a law that 
he intentionally followed. If the parents were physically stopping him, this would be a 
cause, not a reason. In addition, statements of impossibility (“it is impossible for a boy to 
grow a beard”) (p. 709) were coded as causes, whereas impossibility could be meant in a 
psychological way. For instance, I might consider it impossible to bungee jump, not 
because gravity is suspended, but because of my lack of courage, in light of which my 
intention is formed. 
Finally, the main question in the study, regarding why someone cannot perform a 
desired but physically impossible action, is importantly different from the question of 
why someone did perform an action. An appropriate explanation for the latter question is 
necessarily a causal one. To explain why someone did something is to establish the 
factor(s) that generated the action. On the other hand, the relationship between the failure 
of an impossible (but desired and attempted) action and its explanation is not causal. 
Several arguments support this claim. 
Consider the case of the child in Kalish’s study (1998) who responded to the 
question, “Why can’t this boy [who was attempting to touch the ceiling] touch the 
ceiling?” by saying that the boy wasn’t tall enough. This answer is perfectly sensible, but 
not being tall enough and being unable to touch the ceiling are not events or actions but 
rather ongoing states of affairs, and one state of affairs (not being tall enough) does not 
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actually generate, or cause, another state of affairs (i.e., his inability to touch the ceiling). 
When we think of a causal chain, it is difficult or impossible to think of one state of 
affairs generating another state of affairs, and that state of affairs generating another state 
of affairs, etc., without any definable intervening events or actions occurring.  
Relatedly, probably the most basic criterion for our considering a relationship to 
be causal, one that even preschoolers utilize in their causal judgments (e.g., Woolley, 
Browne, & Boerger, 2004), is that the cause must always precede the effect. However, in 
this case the boy’s not being tall enough does not precede his inability to touch the 
ceiling; both are states of affairs that exist simultaneously.  
A final argument is that the relationship between not being tall enough and being 
unable to touch the ceiling is not causal but rather logical. As touching the ceiling is 
possible if and only if the boy is above a certain height, and it’s the case that the boy is 
not above that height, then it can be deduced that he cannot touch the ceiling. Causal 
relationships, on the other hand, do not have this logical relationship; an effect can be 
predicted, but cannot directly be deduced from a cause.  
Because of these limitations, the conclusion that preschoolers can explain human 
behavior appropriately with reasons and causes should be considered tentative. 
Nevertheless, these studies corroborate the claim that 4-year-olds do not reason about 
people’s behavior solely in psychological terms. They realize that people’s intentions to 
act are sometimes superceded by physical forces. 
In summary, preschoolers older than 3 are able to explain or choose explanations 
for (non-human) events in a causal way, as well as explain human behavior. Further, 
under certain circumstances they can explain behavior not solely in terms of psychology, 
but in other ways as well. That is, they seem to grasp that human beings are physical 
objects in the world that are subject to physical forces in addition to psychological agents 
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with beliefs, desires and goals. These are important prerequisites for being able to 
understand both causes and reasons in explanations of human behavior.  
 
Children’s understanding of the relations among the components of intention 
It is well known that up to age three children do not have a mature notion of 
intention. They cannot, for example, distinguish between intention and desires (e.g., 
Astington, 2001; Wellman & Phillips, 2001). According to Astington (2001) toddlers 
have a general notion that conflates desire and intention. Supporting this idea is the fact 
that children do not use such terms as intend to, on purpose, or mean to until their 
preschool years. But as early as 1 ½ years they talk about goals and desires, primarily 
with the term want (Wellman & Phillips, 2001). In fact, Bartsch and Wellman (1995) 
analyzed 200,000 utterances of children aged 2-5, and found over 5000 genuine 
references to desire (e.g., “want”).  
What about preschoolers? Do they have a mature notion of “intention” that 
includes the correct relations among its components? The findings of research on their 
ideas about intention are quite complex and sometimes contradictory.  
Two studies by Astington speak to this question. The author interprets the results 
as suggesting that 3- to 5-year-olds can distinguish action from desire and outcome, but 
that they may equate intention with action. In one study with 3- to 5-year-olds (Astington, 
1999), children were told a series of stories in which each of two characters wanted 
something but only one actually acted to get it. The other actor obtained the object 
through some stroke of luck, although he was not trying to get it. The following is an 
example: 
“Bert is at the apple farm. He wants an apple off the tree. He can’t reach it. He 
climbs on a box. He still can’t reach it….Ernie is at the apple farm too. He wants 
an apple off the tree. It’s too high up. He doesn’t know what to do. Then the apple 
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falls off the tree, onto the ground beside Ernie…Which guy was trying to get an 
apple off the tree?” (p. 308) 
 
Even the youngest children were able to pick out the one that was “trying to” 
obtain the desired object, despite the fact that he did not obtain it. These results suggest 
that 3- to 5-year-olds recognize “trying” when it is associated with an obvious action, and 
can distinguish it from both desiring and obtaining. It is also possible, however, that 3-
year-olds simply associate “trying” with “not getting” and conversely “getting” with “not 
trying,” and therefore chose the picture associated with the character who did not end up 
getting the object. As in many of the studies cited here, these limitations mitigate the 
apparent conclusion, which in this case is that children as young as 3 conceptually 
differentiate among desire, action, and outcome. 
In another study by Astington (1991), 3-year-olds could not distinguish between 
action and intending/preparing, but 5-year-olds could. In this study, 3- to 5-year-olds 
were shown pictures of two characters – one who was performing an action and one who 
was preparing to (intended to) perform the action. The point of the study was to see 
whether children would choose different pictures for a question about actions (“Who’s 
painting?”) and one about intentions (“Who’s gonna/thinks he’ll/wants to/would like to 
paint?”) (p. 167). A majority of the 5-year-olds, but few 3-year-olds, distinguished 
between action and intention by choosing the action picture for the action question and 
the “preparing to” picture for the intention question. Here 3-year-olds showed, by 
choosing the action picture for the intention question, that they associate intention not 
with the mental state that it is, but with action. 
Data from this study (Astington, 1991) suggest that 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-
olds, understand that intentions/desires differ from their subsequent actions. Astington 
argues that this change comes at around 4 years of age, the same time that children come 
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to see beliefs as representational. She suggests that there is a general change in children’s 
understanding of mental states at about 4 years of age that underlies both of these 
understandings.  
Supporting the idea of 4-year-olds coming to see intentions differently from 3-
year-olds is another set of studies by Feinfield, et al. (1999), in which 3-year-olds could 
not distinguish between intention or desire and outcome, but 4-year-olds could. In the 
first study, the children heard stories in which the characters’ intentions differed from 
both the desire and the outcome. The characters wanted to go to location A, but decided 
(intended) to go to location B because their mothers told them to go there. However, they 
inadvertently ended up at location A, which was where they wanted to go. Children were 
asked where the characters thought they were going to go, where they tried to go, and 
where they wanted to go. If they answered the intention questions (where he thought he 
was going and where he tried to go) according to desire, they would be incorrect. 
Similarly, if they saw matches between the desire and outcome as indicating that the act 
of going to location A was intentional (using the “matching rule”), they would also be 
wrong. To be correct, they must understand that intentions are mental states that do not 
necessarily match desires or outcomes. 
In this study (Fienfeld, et al., 1999) the 4-year-olds performed significantly better 
on the “try” questions, the “think” questions, and nearly significantly better on the “want” 
questions than did the 3-year-olds. The 3-year-olds performed significantly worse than 
chance on the “try” and “think” questions (those asking about intention), whereas the 4-
year-olds performed significantly better than chance on those questions. Both age-groups 
performed significantly better than chance on the “like” question (asking about desire). 
In a second, similar study in which the desire differs from the intention (Fienfeld, 
et al.), 3- and 4-year-old children heard stories in which a character’s mother sends him 
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to find an object in a location, and there the character finds a different, more desirable 
object than the one he was originally looking for. Children were asked what the character 
was trying to get and what he thought he was going to get. Again, the 4-year-olds 
performed significantly better than the 3-year-olds. The older children were significantly 
above chance levels on the two intention questions (“What does he think he’ll do,” “what 
is he trying to do”), but the 3-year-olds were only slightly above chance on the “try” 
question and were at chance on the “think” question. Thus, the 4-year-olds are again are 
shown to be more sophisticated than 3-year-olds in their concept of intention. 
Still another study pitting desire against intention is Schult’s (2002) Experiment 2, 
in which 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds played a game involving tossing bean bags into buckets, 
some of which contained a prize. In each trial they chose beforehand which bucket to aim 
for but they did not know which buckets contained prizes. After each trial they were 
asked what they were trying to do, as well what they had wanted (it was assumed that 
they wanted the prize, although which bucket they were aiming for had nothing to do 
with whether there was a prize in the bucket). All age groups were able to report their 
intention correctly when they hit the bucket at which they were aiming. However, 
whereas the 4- and 5-year olds scored 100% on these questions even when they did not 
hit the aimed-for bucket, the 3-year-olds were not able to separate their intentions (to hit 
the bucket they were told to aim for) from their desires (to get a prize) when they missed 
the bucket they were aiming for and got a prize anyway. They tended to say they were 
trying to hit the bucket with the prize all along, although they had no way of knowing that 
the prize was in that bucket. 
Here the 3-year-olds seem to have been using a desire-outcome matching strategy 
(the “matching rule”). That is, when their desire to get a prize matched what actually 
happened, they inferred that getting a prize was what they were intending to do. What 
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these children did not understand is that the fulfillment of one’s desired outcome does not 
by itself imply that a purposeful act has occurred. Rather, one’s desired outcome can 
come about in various ways, only a subset of which suggests that his or her action was 
purposeful. Specifically, for one’s action to be considered intentional one has to intend to 
perform the action, actually perform it, and possess the skill and luck to act successfully 
from the actor’s point of view.  
Four- and 5-year olds, on the other hand, showed a more mature understanding of 
intention. They did not assume that when a bucket with a prize was hit that bucket was 
the intended one. Rather, they limited their claims that they had done what they were 
trying to do to instances in which they hit the bucket for which they’d been told to aim,  
thereby demonstrating their ability to distinguish their desires from their intentions and 
from the outcome.  
Based on the previous several studies, 4-year-olds do seem to have a more mature 
idea of intention than do 3-year-olds. However, they have a long way to go before their 
notion of intention is adult-like. In a study by Baird and Moses (2001), 4-year-olds had 
trouble attributing different desires to two people performing the same action, whereas 5-
year-olds had no trouble with this. The authors told 4- and 5-year-old children stories in 
which two characters performed the same action but had different desires (running home 
for dinner versus running to get healthy and strong). They were then asked what each 
character tried to do (e.g., get somewhere fast versus get some exercise). Although 5-
year-olds could attribute different intentions to the actors with the same action, 4-year-
olds tended to attribute the same intention to the actors. As noted by the authors, 4-year-
olds’ pattern of response suggests that their understanding of intention may still be 
inextricably tied to action. Thus, although Astington (1991) hypothesizes that children 
learn to separate intentions from actions (or, as she puts it, see intentions 
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“representationally”) at about 4 years of age, these data (Baird & Moses, 2001) show that 
4-year-olds have not quite reached that stage yet.  
In sum, what do these studies indicate about the ability of preschoolers to 
coordinate the relations among the various components of intention? First consider 3-
year-olds. Research suggests that that they are just beginning to be able to relate some of 
the components to each other. Although they have trouble distinguishing intention from 
action (Astington, 1991), desire from intention (Fienfeld, 1999), and desire and intention 
from outcome (Schult, 2002), they can use the “matching rule” to infer the intentionality 
of an action based on whether the desire matches the outcome. The matching rule was a 
liability in some of the more difficult studies, in which the desire did not match the 
intention or outcome, but everyday experience suggests that in the majority of cases it is 
an effective strategy that even adults use when some of the relevant information is not 
available.   
Regarding older preschoolers, some of the research just reviewed shows that 4-
year-olds’ understanding of the relations among the various components of intentional 
action is better than that of the 3-year-olds, but is still far from adult-like. Their 
capabilities include distinguishing between intentions and desires (Fienfeld, et al., 1999) 
and even between desires, intentions, and outcomes (Schult, 2002), which is impressive 
given the similarity between desire and intention. On the other hand, Baird and Moses 
(2001) showed that they are not able to attribute different intentions to people who are 
performing the same action, even when the intentions are clearly spelled out. They also 
have deficits in judging whether intentions have been acted upon, tending to say that 
someone has acted intentionally whenever the desired outcome is fulfilled (Schult, 2002).  
Not many of the studies about the relations among the components of 
intentionality included 5-year-olds, and still fewer address relations that might distinguish 
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them from 4-year-olds. Astington (1991) showed that 5-year-olds could distinguish 
between action and preparing/intending, though 3-year-olds could not. It is not clear, 
however, how 4-year-olds would perform in relation to 3- and 5-year-olds. In addition, 
they could attribute different intentions to people who were performing the same action 
(Baird & Moses, 2001). Finally, like 4-year-olds they are able to separate intentions from 
desires and outcomes (Schult, 2002). 
As we can see, children learn quite a lot about intention during their preschool 
years. They go from, at age 3, seeing intention as action, to at age 5, seeing it as a mental 
representation that differs from action, desire and outcome.  
Preschoolers’ understanding of intentional versus unintentional behavior  
We have just seen what preschoolers know about intention and its relation to 
desires, action and outcome. What do they know about the difference between intentional 
and unintentional behavior? I review studies on this topic next. 
In one study (Shultz, Wells, & Sarda, 1980), the authors had 3-, 5-, and 7-year-
olds perform intentional actions and mistakes (mistakes were elicited by having children 
perform tasks at which they were likely to fail because they were difficult). The authors 
asked whether the children meant to do the mistakes, such as say a tongue twister 
incorrectly. Children of all 3 age groups said their actions were intentional more for the 
intentional actions than for the mistakes. 
In a second study, Schultz et al. (1980) elicited movements in children that were 
either intentional or unintentional (e.g., a knee jerk brought on by tapping below the knee 
versus an intentional movement of the leg) and again asked, “Did you mean to x”? The 5- 
and 7- year-olds (but not the 3-year-olds) said “yes” more to the intentional than to the 
unintentional behaviors. 
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Why did 3-year-olds perform differently in the two studies? They seem to 
understand the difference between mistakes and intentional actions but not between 
passive movements and intentional actions. It could be that because the outcome in the 
first study (messing up on the tongue twisters) obviously conflicts with the original desire 
(saying them correctly), the “matching rule” strategy predicts the correct answer, whereas 
in the second study there is no relevant desire and the outcome is emotionally neutral. 
Alternatively, perhaps the 3-year-olds were simply less interested in the second study, as 
it involved such mundane tasks as moving a leg, as opposed to Study 1, which involved 
more exciting tasks like saying tongue-twisters and patting one’s head while rubbing 
one’s belly. Finally, it is possible that mistakes, which are the unfulfillment of a definite 
intention, are easier to differentiate from intended acts than are passive movements, 
which are performed without any intention. Perhaps there is something about trying to do 
something and failing that is more attention-getting and easier to grasp than doing 
something without having an intention at all. 
In a somewhat similar study, Schultz and Wells (1985) also endeavored to test 
children’s ability to discriminate between intentional and unintentional actions. They 
played a game with 3-, 7-, and 11-year-olds in which actors shot a ray-gun at different-
colored targets. Colored cards indicated which target the actor was to shoot at and a light 
on the target indicated which target was actually hit. Children observed the card being 
chosen, the actor shooting the gun, and a particular target being hit (the outcome). 
Sometimes the intention matched the outcome and sometimes it did not match. Children 
were asked whether the actor hit the one he hit on purpose. Even the 3-year-olds were 
able to determine when the outcome was brought about intentionally by matching the 
intention to the outcome (when they matched, the behavior was seen as intentional, but 
when they did not match, it was not). Thus they showed an understanding of the 
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motivational aspect of intention (that the intention to act is usually directed toward a 
particular goal). 
In another study addressing preschoolers’ understanding of the intentionality 
versus non-intentionality of behavior, Smith (1978) showed 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old 
children various behaviors on videotape. Some of the behaviors were intentional (such as 
doing arm exercises and chewing something) and others were unintentional (such as 
sneezing and saying “ow” in response to a poke in the ribs). Participants were asked 
whether the actor was “trying to” and whether she “wanted to” do the actions. Four-year-
olds tended to say that all the actions were intentional, whereas the older children said 
that only the voluntary behaviors were intentional.  
However, the reason 4-year-olds performed worse on Smith’s (1984) study than 
in the ones previously described may be that something about the cues to intentionality 
on the videotapes was amiss; several of the involuntary behaviors were judged to be 
voluntary by many of the adults. Also, since the videotapes contained several behaviors 
other than the one in question, the younger children may have misunderstood which 
action the experimenter was referring to. For example, in the sequence in which the 
woman was poked in the ribs and said “ow,” these children may have thought the 
experimenter was asking about whether the person poking the woman in the ribs meant to 
do it, and not whether the woman meant to say “ow.”  
Most of these studies show that in certain simple cases 3-year-olds are able to 
detect intentionality of action using the “matching rule.” Older children can make use of 
the rule in more complex situations. Although this does not require an understanding of 
intention as different from desire, nor does it include the important component of belief, 
it does require an understanding of the motivational component of intention. None of the 
studies reviewed in this section were designed to tease apart children’s understanding of 
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desire from that of intention or to require consideration of the actors’ beliefs; therefore 
we cannot know at this point just how mature preschoolers’ conceptions of intentional 
versus non-intentional acts are. In Smith’s study (1978) 5-year-olds showed a more 
mature concept than 4-year-olds in that they, but not younger children, knew which 
behaviors in the video were intentional, but the experiment’s flaws seriously undermine 
the conclusion that 4-year-olds tend to interpret all actions as being intentional. 
Overall, then, we have seen that Malle’s (1999) model of how we explain human 
behavior stands up to conceptual inquiry as well as to empirical inquiry with adults. In 
addition, I have shown that preschoolers have some facility with various aspects of the 
model, such as a nascent understanding of intention and related mental states (e.g., desire, 
etc.) and the ability to choose and provide causal explanations for various actions and 
states of the world.  
 The overall question in the present research, one that previously has not been 
addressed effectively, concerns children’s ability to shift their mode of explanation 
according to the intentionality of the behavior they seek to explain. Does this ability 
appear during the preschool years? If so, when does it appear, and how should its 
development be characterized?  
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OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
To address this question empirically, I conducted two studies that were similar to 
those by Malle (1999) and White (1991) in the overall question as well as the basic 
design. To review, in Malle’s Experiment 1 (1999), as well as in White’s study (1991), 
adults were presented with causally ambiguous actions explained by reasons or causes. 
Based on the type of explanation given, they rated the intentionality of each behavior. 
Relations between intentionality judgments and the given explanation type were assessed.  
Similarly, in my own Experiment 1, I assessed children’s judgments of the 
intentionality of actions given cause or reason explanations. Young children are concrete 
thinkers in many ways, however, and thus find it easier to express judgments by pointing 
to one out of two illustrated scenarios than by verbalizing one of two abstract alternatives 
(intentional versus unintentional) that cannot effectively be represented through drawings 
(Browne & Woolley, 2004). Therefore, instead of presenting explained behaviors one at a 
time, I presented them two at a time, one with a reason explanation attached and the other 
with a cause explanation. Children were asked to indicate which of the two actions was 
done on purpose3.  
Recall that Malle’s second study (1999) addressed the same basic concept as did 
his first study but differed in terms of which of the two pieces of information 
(intentionality of the action, type of explanation) was given by the experimenter and 
                                                 
3 The reason I chose to ask children to point out the action that was performed on purpose in every 
trial, as opposed to asking them which action was not performed on purpose in half the trials, is that in 
my experience young children tend to get confused when the test question is not consistent for each 
trial but the possible responses are the same. Apparently it is not easy for children to “switch gears” in 
order to reason about opposite concepts between questions. 
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which was requested from the participant. Likewise, in Experiment 2 here children were 
presented with the intentionality of actions and were asked for explanations.  
However, whereas Malle (1999) presented obviously intentional or unintentional 
actions (e.g., grinding one’s teeth during sleep or asking a friend to come over for lunch) 
and assessed whether participants’ explanations were reasons or causes, I presented the 
same causally ambiguous stories as in Experiment 1 and told participants whether they 
were done on purpose or not. I then asked them to choose between a reason and a cause 
explanation by pointing to the appropriate illustration. This design allowed me to 
compare performance in the two studies directly, as well as to ensure that children’s 
explanation choices were based on intentionality as explicitly provided by the 
experimenter. If children’s explanation choices were derived from their own judgments 
of the intentionality of particular actions, there would be more than a remote possibility 
that between-subject variability in the main dependent variable (which explanation was 
chosen) would include variability in children’s tacit judgments of how purposeful the 
given actions are. Directly telling children whether or not each action is intentional 
therefore would presumably result in “cleaner” data.  
With respect to performance in Experiments 1 and 2 considered together, it was 
difficult to come up with precise expectations regarding the age at which children would 
show an understanding of the relation between intentional action and mental explanation 
and between unintentional action and physical explanation. As a whole this research 
suggests that 3-year-olds have some understanding of different types of causality but are 
“bad explainers” and depend on outcome information to make judgments about intention. 
As the research conducted here gave no a priori desire information and the outcomes 
were mostly neutral, it seemed quite unlikely that this age group would succeed. 
Therefore, 3-year-olds were not included as participants in the present experiments. 
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Four-year-olds have a more mature concept of intention and explanation; 
however, they apparently do not understand that two people with different intentions can 
perform the same action, which is an important aspect of the present tasks. What little 
research included 5-year-olds indicates that, crucial to this research, a single action can 
be motivated by different intentions. Nevertheless, the tasks here required systematic 
coordination of intentionality of action and type of explanation, thus it seemed that this 
ability might continue to develop beyond age five. In addition to 4- and 5-year-olds, 6-





 Seventy-six children (approximately half girls) participated. Twenty-nine were 4-
year-olds (M = 4;5, range =  4;0-4;11), twenty-five were 5-year-olds (M = 4;6, range = 
5;0-5;11), and twenty-nine were 6-year-olds (M = 6;6, range = 6;0-7;0). Names were 
obtained from birth records kept on file at a university research laboratory and children 
were recruited through letter and telephone contact with the parents. Most participants 
were White and middle class, but several ethnic groups were represented, including 
Latino, African American, East Asian, and South Asian.  
Stimuli and Design 
Each participant was presented with six illustrated stories featuring protagonists 
performing actions. Two versions of each story were presented to children in each of the 
six trials: one in which the action was explained by giving a reason, and one in which the 
(same) action was explained by giving a cause. The versions differed only in the name of 
the protagonist performing the action and the explanation for the action; the actions 
themselves, the illustrations, and the gender of the protagonists were the same.   
It was important that the actions in the stories be causally ambiguous. That is, the 
action itself, without explanation, should be perceived as being approximately equally 
likely to be performed intentionally as unintentionally. Causally ambiguous actions were 
chosen by presenting eleven adults with a list of 10 actions that seemed to be causally 
ambiguous and having them rate the intentionality of the actions themselves, without 
explanation, on a scale of -5, “definitely unintentional” to +5, “definitely intentional.” A 
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zero rating represented causal ambiguity. The six actions whose average of the eleven 
ratings was equal to 0, +1, or -1 were used.  
In order to control for possible effects of story order and potential biases in 
children toward the intentionality or non-intentionality of particular actions4, two 
variables were counterbalanced or randomized. First, story order was counterbalanced 
between participants. Within participants, the order in which the two types of explanation 
for actions (reason versus cause) were presented within the answer choices alternated. 
An issue that deserves special consideration involves the particular words used to 
represent the concepts of intentionality and non-intentionality in both Experiments 1 and 
2. Obviously this is an important matter, as the validity of the data generated by this 
research rests on conveying to children the meaning of the words as well as the relation 
between them.  
To convey intentionality of action I chose to use the phrase “on purpose” for a 
few reasons. First, in response to an informal, free-response question directed to the 
parents before the commencement of the experimental session, they were most likely to 
include the term “on purpose” in reporting which words/terms their child uses to indicate 
the intentionality of an action compared to other terms. The second most reported phrase 
was “meant to,” which is used in part of the test question, as explained later. Although 
some other studies have used the term “try to” to indicate intentionality (e.g., Astington, 
1991), this term is problematic in addition to rarely being uttered by children (according 
to their parents). The main issue involves the term’s implication concerning whether the 
                                                 
4 Although adults had previously judged the stories to be completely or nearly causally ambiguous, it 
seemed possible that children could differ slightly in their perceptions of whether certain actions are 
more likely to be either intentional or non-intentional. 
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action was successfully executed. According to common usage, “try to [action]” implies a 
failed effort. For example, one might say, “I tried to kill the mosquito.” This statement 
implies that the speaker desired, attempted, and endeavored to catch the mosquito, but her 
efforts were somehow thwarted. “On purpose,” on the other hand, clearly communicates 
that the desired action was successfully performed: “I killed the mosquito on purpose.” 
Because the actions in the study are successfully performed, using “on purpose” in this 
study is arguably a better alternative than “tried to.” 
To indicate the non-intentionality of actions in the experiment, I used the term 
“not on purpose”.  Although the most commonly used word/term used by children to 
indicate the non-intentionality of actions (as reported by their parents) was “by accident,” 
this term, with its connotation of a negative outcome, does not quite represent the concept 
this research is meant to tap. The implication of a negative outcome when “by accident” 
is used (especially by children) was confirmed by parents, who nearly all indicated that 
their children use “accident” primarily in the context of fighting with siblings or doing 
something for which they could get into trouble (e.g., hitting, knocking over sand castles, 
etc.). 
 A final reason to use “not on purpose” is to clarify that intentional and 
unintentional actions are mutually exclusive categories whose meanings are precisely 
opposite. When a phrase is contrasted with its negation, with the two members of the pair 
explicitly referring to each other, the pair more clearly communicates an “either-or” 
construct – in this study represented by the dichotomous forced-choice nature of the 
questions – than does a pair whose members, though antonymous in some ways, do not 
explicitly refer to or negate each other. To cite another example, the words “tied” and 
“untied,” referring to shoelaces, are clearly mutually exclusive and opposite in meaning; 
every pair of shoelaces in the world is either tied or untied (ignoring in-between cases 
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such as laces that are extremely badly tied). However, even though, for example, “tied” 
and “loose” can be construed as antonyms because they are contrastive when referring to 
shoe laces, “loose” may project connotations (perhaps “messy” or “unkempt”) that 
“untied” does not have. 
Procedure 
 Children were tested individually in a university laboratory in a mid-sized 
Southwestern city. First, children underwent a warm-up session consisting of a 
clarification of the terms/concepts “on purpose” and “not on purpose.” The first five 
minutes or so were informal; the experimenter tailored her own portion of the interaction 
to the children’s responses, thus the structure and content of this part of the session varied 
somewhat from child to child.  
First the experimenter simply talked with the child about the meaning of “on 
purpose” or “not on purpose.” As stated earlier, almost every child had some notion of 
the “on purpose/not on purpose” dichotomy, but these notions were often wrong or 
incomplete. For example, in response to the question “Do you know what it means to do 
something that’s “on purpose/not on purpose?” many children at first explained the 
concepts with reference to a typical domestic scene in which sibling rivalry, blame, 
punishment, exoneration, and apology are interrelated. For example, with reference to 
“on purpose” several children said something like “when you do something mean and 
don’t say sorry.” One girl said “I hit my brother and he got mad and he told on me, and I 
got in trouble and I had to say sorry.” For “not on purpose” many children’s responses 
involved avoiding punishment. 
When children expressed either an incorrect concept or no concept of the “on 
purpose / not on purpose” distinction, the experimenter explicitly corrected children’s 
concept or explained what “on purpose” and “not on purpose” means. Again, the 
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experimenter’s part of the conversation varied according to the child’s present 
understanding and the situation as a whole, but emphasis was placed on “doing 
something that you were trying to do, something that you thought you were going to do” 
versus “something that just happened, that you weren’t trying to do.” Together the 
experimenter and the child thought of a few valid examples of each. If the child did not 
come up with any examples at the experimenter’s request, the experimenter described 
several actions, such as stepping on someone’s toe, playing, and breathing, and asked 
whether they were on purpose or not. For these questions feedback and explanations were 
given. The goal was to train children on the relevant concepts as well as possible before 
beginning the warm-up questions. 
After this informal discussion, the experimenter asked four standard warm-up 
questions about whether certain actions are on purpose or not on purpose: 1) the 
experimenter walking around the table, 2) the experimenter bumping into a chair, 3) 
dancing5, and 4) sneezing. These questions were meant to be fairly difficult. I wanted to 
emphasize to children that sometimes it took considerable effort to decide whether an 
action is on purpose, as they tended to begin the session by acting as if the decision were 
easy to make, even if they didn’t really understand the concept. In addition, it made sense 
to ask them about actions that (except for one) had neutral outcomes, which was contrary 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, in response to the question, “Is dancing on purpose or not on purpose?” two children said that, 
although it is usually on purpose, if someone were “walking really gracefully” or “going like this” (moving her 
arms around) she would be dancing, even though it would not be on purpose and, presumably, not known by the 
actor. This concept of “dancing” suggests that there is a fact of the matter regarding whether or not a certain type 
of movement counts as “dancing,” rather than that the concept “dancing” involves the actor’s intentions as well as 
others’ perceptions.  In other words, in contrast with adults’ concept of dancing as an artifact category, these 
children treated “dancing” as a natural kind. 
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to their common view that “purpose” and “accidental” are intrinsically related to a 
negative outcome. Children received feedback and explanation after each question. 
The two versions of each story were then read to children in succession, 
presenting different explanations (cause or reason) for each version. (See the actual 
stories used in the Appendix.) In the blocks story, for example, while showing the child 
one of the action pictures the experimenter said, “I’m going to tell you two stories. This 
one is about Cathy. She was playing with some blocks and she made a tower. Then, she 
knocked over the tower. She knocked over the tower because she tripped on it. [Last 
sentence was repeated.]” The other picture (identical to the first) was placed on the table 
next to the first one. “I’m going to tell you another story. This one is about Amy. She was 
playing with some blocks and she made a tower. Then, she knocked over the tower. She 
knocked over the tower because she wanted to make something else. [Last sentence was 
repeated].”  
After the actions and explanations were presented, there was a “memory check”6: 
“Point to the one who knocked over the tower because she wanted to build something 
else.” After the child pointed: “Now point to the one who knocked over the tower 
because she tripped on it.” In the infrequent event that a child erred on a memory check 
(97% correct overall), the experimenter corrected him and repeated the question until the 
participant responded correctly. The dichotomous, forced-choice test question was then 
asked as the experimenter pointed to each illustration in succession: “Which one meant to 
knock over the tower? The one who knocked over the tower because she tripped on it, or 
the one who knocked over the tower because she wanted to build something else? Point 
                                                 
6 The “memory check” questions were asked in order to make sure the children were paying attention to the 
story as well as to emphasize its most important aspects  (the explanations in Experiment 1 and the 
intentionality of the action in Experiment 2), not primarily to test in a meaningful way children’s memory 
for what they had just been told. 
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to the one who knocked over the tower on purpose.”6 No feedback was given for the test 
questions.  
Results and discussion 
Responses to warm-up questions 
 For these questions, responses of participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were 
combined for the purpose of analysis because the two studies included the same warm-up 
session and questions. Each participant was given a score, 0-4, representing the number 
of warm-up questions the child answered correctly. Overall, children’s scores were fairly 
low (M = 2.6, or 66%). As mentioned earlier, however, these questions were meant to be 
more difficult than the ones in the main experiment. It was necessary for them to counter 
the ubiquitous notion among participants that the question of intentionality is always 
about negative outcomes and blame. According to parents, all except one of the 
participants used the on purpose/not on purpose dichotomy at home, and in every case the 
usage was said to be in the context of negative outcomes such as hurting someone or 
breaking something. In the test stories, however, none of the outcomes is inherently 
negative. Therefore, the warm-up questions served as training trials in that three of them 
involved neutral outcomes and children received corrective feedback and explanation 
following responses. Thus, by the time they reached the test trials many children’s 
understanding of the dichotomy had improved.  
Looking at the warm-up scores per age, the mean for four-year-olds was 2.3, or 
58%, for five-year-olds it was 2.6 or 66%, and for six-year-olds the mean was 3.18, or 
80%. The fact that the ages differed in their understanding of intentionality was 
considered to constitute part of the variability in the major question addressed here. That 
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is, the major question is not based on the premise that the participants have equally 
correct or complete concepts of intentionality before they begin the test trials. 
In Experiment 1, children with warm-up scores of 2 or higher were included in 
the rest of the analysis. Although a score of 2 indicates chance level performance, if cases 
with scores of 2 were excluded there would not be data from enough participants to 
analyze it with much power or validity. Also, excluding those with scores of 0 and 1 
ensured that the analyses did not include data from children who had reversed the 
concepts (on purpose and not-on-purpose) in their minds. After cases with the lowest 
scores were excluded there remained 21 four-year-olds, 21 five-year-olds, and 20 six-
year-olds. 
Stories 
One story, bug, was eliminated from further analysis due to an experimenter error 
in which the story was presented to children as unintentional in three of the four “orders” 
and as intentional in only one. Responses on the test question for the other five stories 
were submitted to multiple correlations. These responses in most of the stories were 
significantly positively correlated with those of every other story, and the two 
correlations that were not statistically significant were also positive, though small. Due to 
the overall positive relations of responses across the five stories, I considered them as a 
group for the rest of the analyses.  
Test question (purpose judgments) 
After both versions of each story were read to the child, he was asked which 
character [performed the action] on purpose. Each participant was given a score of 0-5 
indicating the number of test questions answered correctly. A t-test revealed that the 
overall mean (3.6, or 72% of the maximum score) was statistically greater than chance, t 
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(61) = 5.57, p < .001, but not at ceiling level, suggesting that the task was appropriate for 
this age range (4-6).  
Next I addressed the question of age as a factor in performance. A one-way 
ANOVA showed that the age groups’ means (2.8 or 56% for 4-year-olds, 3.6 or 72% for 
5-year-olds, and 4.5 or 90% for 6-year-olds) differed significantly, with performance 
improving with age, F (2, 61) = 7.9, p < .01. See Figure 1 for a depiction of these means 
and standard errors (and the corresponding means and SE for experiment 2). To analyze 
this age effect further, I performed post-hoc multiple comparisons (Tukey HSD) 
contrasting the performance of each age with that of the others. Although neither the 4-
year-olds’ nor the 5-year-olds’ performance differed significantly from that of the next 
oldest group (4 versus 5, 5 versus 6), 6-year-olds performed significantly better than did 
the 4-year-olds, M difference = 1.7, p < .01.  
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Figure 1: Test question performance by age and experiment.  
Despite the fact that a direct comparison of 4-year-olds’ and 5-year-olds’ scores 
indicated that they were not significantly different, 4-year-olds’ performance was no 
better than chance level, whereas5- and 6-year-olds’ performance exceeded chance by a 
fairly wide margin (for 5-year-olds t (20) = 2.9, p < .01; for 6-year-olds t (19) = 8.5, p < 
.001). Thus, it seems that near the beginning of their sixth year children acquire some 
understanding of the relation between the intentionality of action and the kind of 
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causality (mental versus physical) that should be applied to the explanation type, and that 




In this study the experimenter read to children six stories about a character 
performing an action, told them whether or not the action was on purpose, and asked 
them to choose between a cause explanation and a reason explanation for the action. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-five children (approximately half girls) participated. Twenty-four were 4-
year-olds (M = 4;6, range = 3;11-4;11), twenty-four were 5-year-olds (M = 5;6, range = 
5;0-5;11), and twenty-seven were 6-year-olds (M = 6;6, range = 6;0-7;0). Names were 
obtained in the same manner as in Experiment 1 and the ethnic makeup of the 
participants was approximately the same.  
Stimuli and design 
As in Experiment 1, each participant was presented with six illustrated stories 
depicting protagonists performing causally ambiguous actions (the same stories and 
drawings as in Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, however, there was only one version of 
each story instead of two. After each story was read to the child and he was told whether 
the action was on purpose or not, he was asked to choose between two drawings 
representing possible explanations for the action.  
To control for order effects and potential intentionality biases, again a few 
variables were counterbalanced. First, the order of the stories was counterbalanced across 
participants. Then, the intentionality of each action presented (whether the action was 
intentional or not) was counterbalanced between participants so that the action in each 
story was said to be intentional for half of the children and unintentional for the other 
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half. Within subjects, the intentionality of the first answer choice for the test question 
(“Point to the one that shows why she did it”) was counterbalanced. 
It was important that the drawings representing the two explanations in each trial 
not “give away” the intentionality of the action they explained. If children tended to 
perceive either of the two explanation drawings in a trial as somehow depicting more 
intentionality than the other, they could respond to the test question (“Point to the one 
that shows why she did it…”) on that basis instead of by considering the explanations 
themselves and whether the action was said to be intentional or unintentional. The goal 
was for the illustrations to represent the explanations so they could serve as a concrete 
icons for the children to point to after hearing what they represent, but not to indicate the 
actions’ intentionality directly. 
To address this concern I showed ten 4- through 6-year-olds the pairs of 
explanation pictures used for each story. After I told them what the action in the pictures 
was I asked which depicted child did it on purpose. For example, for the jungle gym 
story, in which a boy drops down from a monkey bar, the picture for the cause 
explanation shows a boy hanging from a bar with one hand, with curved lines over the 
hand showing movement. The other picture shows the same thing, but with a swing 
within the boy’s sight. The first picture is supposed to represent the cause (the boy’s hand 
slipping off the bar) and the other is supposed to represent the reason (the boy dropping 
down from the bar in order to play on the swing). The question was: “These two boys 
dropped down from the bar. Which one did it on purpose?” For each pair of pictures 
approximately half of the responses were correct. Thus, children could not infer the 
intentionality of action based on the explanation pictures.  
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Procedure 
The warm-up session was the same as in Experiment 1.  Following the warm-up, 
children received the six experimental trials. For each of the trials, the experimenter read 
a story about a protagonist performing an action. For example, “This is Frank. Frank was 
at a birthday party and someone gave him a balloon. Then he popped the balloon.” 
Children were told whether the action was on purpose or not:  “He meant to pop the 
balloon. He did it on purpose” or “He didn’t mean to pop the balloon. He didn’t do it on 
purpose.” The “memory check” was next: “Did he do it on purpose, or not on purpose?” 
Feedback was given. For the two children who answered a memory check incorrectly the 
question was repeated until they gave the correct answer.  
Then the test question was asked: “Why do you think he popped the balloon? Do 
you think he popped it because he wanted to hear the popping sound it made (pointing to 
the picture), or do you think he popped it because he dropped it on something sharp 
(pointing to other picture)? Point to the one that shows why he popped the balloon.” 
Finally, children were reminded of the intentionality of the action: “Remember, he did it 
on purpose.” For the test question no feedback was given.                        
The hypotheses for Experiment 1 applied to this study as well, but were 
additionally informed by the research about preschoolers’ explanations. Recall that 
preschoolers are able to choose reasonable explanations out of several choices. However, 
choosing explanations in this experiment seems more difficult than that in the studies 
mentioned above. For example, in Springer and Keil’s (1991) study many of 
preschoolers’ explanation options were obviously wrong, such as explaining the color of 
flowers as a little man who paints flo wers pink. As in Experiment 1, it seemed likely that 
the development of choosing explanations based on the intentionality of action would not 
be complete at age five and would continue to improve throughout the child’s sixth year. 
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Results and discussion 
Warm-up Questions 
As stated earlier, for these questions the data from the two experiments were 
combined. See the results for Experiment 1 for these data. Participants with warm-up 
scores of less than 2 were again excluded from further analyses. The remaining 
participants in Experiment 2 were 16 4-year-olds, 18 5-year-olds, and 24 6-year-olds.  
Stories 
Because the bug story was excluded from analysis in Experiment 1, it was 
excluded here as well. Fortuitously, multiple correlations on the six stories indicated that 
bug was the only story that was negatively correlated with the others. Most of the other 
correlations (except 3 positive non-redundant correlations), though positive, were non-
significant. To further investigate the relations among the stories I submitted them to a 
factor analysis. The criterion for retention of components was whether their eigenvalues 
were equal to or greater than 1.0. Two factors were extracted: bug was one factor, and the 
other stories comprised the second factor. Thus, data from the other five stories were 
included in the rest of the analysis.     
Test Question 
Each participant was given a score of 0-5 indicating the number of test questions 
answered correctly. A t-test revealed that, as in Experiment 1, the overall mean (3.2, or 
64% of the maximum score) was statistically greater than chance, t (57) = 3.6, p < .01, 
but not at ceiling level, indicating that this task was also appropriate for this age range (4-
6).   
The means for each age were as follows: For 4-year-olds M = 2.8, or 56%, and for 
both 5- and 6-year-olds M = 3.3, or 66%. Regarding age as a factor in Experiment 2, a 
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one-way ANOVA showed that overall age did not affect performance, F (2, 55) = .66, p 
> .05. Although there was no significant age effect, I performed post-hoc multiple 
comparisons (Tukey HSD) contrasting the performance of each age with that of the 
others to see whether the 4-year-olds’ performance, which appears to be quite a bit lower 
than that of 5- and 6-year-olds, differed from them when compared directly. The 
comparisons comfirmed the ANOVA, showing that no age group performed significantly 
better than any other. 
However, as in Experiment 1, the performance of these 4-year-olds were worse 
than that of the older groups in the sense that the youngest group’s mean, 2.8, does not 
exceed chance level (2.5) whereas the older group’s means do. For 5-year-olds M  = 3.3; t 
(17) = 2.2, p < .05, and for 6-year-olds M = 3.3; t (23) = 2.7, p < .05. The t-values differ 
despite apparently equivalent means because the groups have unequal numbers of 
participants. 
“On purpose” versus “not on purpose” trials 
 Because Study 2’s design involved within-subject differences, with half of the 
trials featuring intentional actions and half featuring unintentional actions, it was possible 
to assess whether children found one type of action to be easier to reason about than the 
other, as well as to see whether responses on the two trial types were correlated.  
To assess the effects of trial type (whether the action presented is intentional or 
not) and age on performance, as well as whether the effect of trial type varies by age, I 
conducted a mixed design ANOVA. This between-within analysis showed that there was 
no interaction between age and the two types of trial, F (2, 56) = .11, p > 05, indicating 
that the effect of trial type was similar at each age group.  Specifically, scores on the on 
purpose trials (M = 1.7, or 55%) were significantly higher than those on the not on 
purpose trials (M = 1.4, or 45%). See Figure 2 for mean scores and standard errors. This 
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finding, in combination with the absence of an interaction between Age and Trial Type, 
suggests that even as children progress from responding at chance level to responding 
significantly above chance, reasoning about unintentional actions (at least in terms of 
explaining them) lags behind reasoning about purposeful actions.  
Figure 2: Performance on intentional and unintentional trials by age.  
Correlation between trial types 
 To find out whether performance on one trial type (e.g., intentional action) had 
any bearing on that performance on the other trial type (unintentional action) I calculated 
the Pearson product moment correlation between them and found it to be quite small, r = 
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.19, ns. The fact that responses on the on purpose and not on purpose items were 
uncorrelated was somewhat surprising, as they were meant to address different aspects of 
the same concept.  
Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 
A two-way (Age X Experiment) ANOVA revealed that there was no significant 
interaction between experiment and age, F (143) = 2.3, p > .05. This finding suggests that 
performance in Experiment 2, which seemed to improve somewhat with age but showed 
no significant age effect when considered separately, had enough of a developmental 
trend to prevent an experiment X age interaction. Thus, the question of whether 
performance on Experiment 2 improved with age is not straightforward. When analyzed 
alone it does not show an age effect. However, as Experiment 1 shows a significant age 
effect and there is no interaction between age and experiment, it would not be accurate to 
consider performance on Study 2 not to have been affected by age.    
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary of results 
In this research I investigated young children’s knowledge of the relationship 
between the intentionality of an action and whether it was generated by the actor’s mental 
states or by a direct mechanical force. Four-year-olds seemed to possess little 
understanding of this relation, whereas 5- and 6-year-olds in both studies showed a 
moderate degree of understanding. Performance in Experiment 1 improved significantly 
with age, and evidence that performance in Experiment 2 improved with age was mixed. 
In Experiment 2, the trials in which children chose an explanation for an 
intentional action were compared with those in which they chose an explanation for an 
unintentional action. Overall, children performed better on the intentional trials, and there 
was no significant interaction between age and trial type. These findings suggest that the 
difference between scores on the two trial types was similar across ages.  Finally, 
performance on trials with intentional actions was uncorrelated with performance on 
trials with unintentional actions. 
How do these findings relate to those of the most relevant studies reviewed earlier 
in terms of the age at which the knowledge assessed by my research is gained? Does past 
research serve in any way serve to explain or corroborate these results? 
The chronology of learning to explain behavior 
In most of the relevant past studies participants were younger than those tested in 
the present research (e.g., Barsch & Wellman, 1989; Hood & Bloom, 1979; Kalish, 
1998), and therefore the findings do not directly speak to the present issue as a whole. 
The authors of these studies were mainly concerned with young children’s understanding 
of some of the important basic components of the relatively complex ability addressed 
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here. Some of these components include causal explanation in general, the understanding 
of intention as a mental state, the distinction between intentional and unintentional 
behavior, and the ability to be flexible in explaining various types of actions (i.e., by 
referring to intentional, biological, or physical forces). Thus, although there is enough 
past research to get an idea of the nature and timing of young children’s abilities that are 
relevant to the present research, the extent to which the findings of past studies can shed 
light on the present findings is somewhat limited. 
One question involves the failure of the 4-year-olds in the both of the present 
studies to show understanding of the relation between intentionality of action and type of 
explanation in their responses. Two studies (Kalish, 1998; Schult & Wellman, 1997) 
indicate that 4-year-olds are capable of explaining human behavior flexibly. That is, the 
studies show that these children understand that non-intentional forces can affect, or even 
generate, human action. 
However, the present studies arguably require a more advanced, or perhaps more 
specific, understanding of the relationship between action and explanation than do these 
previous studies. First, as discussed earlier, Kalish’s study (1998) does not really address 
the understanding of causal explanation. In addition, in that study all the actions involved 
an obvious intentional component (intending and attempting to perform the action to 
fulfill a specific desire), so the only aspect of each scenario that was not intentional was 
the outcome. Knowing simply that intentional actions are sometimes thwarted by non-
physical forces seems easier than understanding that 1) causally ambiguous actions can 
be generated either by mental or by physical forces, and that 2) the type of force 
generating the action dictates whether or not the action was on purpose as well as what 
type of explanation should be given.   
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Similarly, although Schult and Wellman’s studies (1997) also provide evidence 
that 4-year-olds are not constrained to psychological explanations for human behavior, 
again the tasks in their research seem easier than the present ones. In those studies the 
stories with intentional actions ended with an inherently positive outcome, whereas the 
stories with unintentional actions ended with an inherently negative outcome. Children 
could use desire words like “want” in the explanation whenever the actor obtained what 
she wanted (using something like the “matching rule”), and could avoid such words when 
the outcome did not match the actor’s desire. This strategy would lead to explaining 
actions in different ways without necessarily understanding the underlying factors that 
generate intentional and unintentional behavior. 
By contrast, the tasks in the present studies do not provide major clues to children 
about how to explain an action beyond the statement of whether or not it is on purpose, as 
the actions are causally ambiguous and the outcomes are the same whether caused by an 
intentional or unintentional action. Thus the poor performance of the 4-year-olds in this 
difficult study does not necessarily contradict the findings of relevant studies done 
previously.  
Not much is known, however, about the development between ages 5 and 6 of 
intention- and explanation-related knowledge because most of these studies test relatively 
simple abilities. Thus 6-year-olds are usually not included within the participants. It 
seems that currently the most common approach to developmental research related to the 
present studies is to find the very earliest that children begin to demonstrate a modicum 
of understanding of a particular concept or ability without exploring how the concept or 
ability continues to develop. Perhaps investigation of children’s concepts and abilities 
should be extended to older ages, as concepts and abilities are not usually discrete entities 
that are acquired all at once. On the other hand, perhaps other researchers have found 
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little relevant development in pilot tests comparing 5- and 6-year-olds and thus focus on 
younger children. 
As discussed earlier, although there was no interaction between experiment and 
age, when considered separately Experiment 1 showed an age effect but Experiment 2 did 
not. It was expected that the understanding addressed here would improve with age, so 
the real question concerns why there was not more of an age effect in Experiment 2.  
Recall that in this experiment children were told whether actions were on purpose or not 
on purpose, and they chose one of two possible explanations for the actions, either a 
reason or a cause.  Perhaps there is some limiting factor present in Experiment 2, but not 
in Experiment 1, that is unrelated to the main question in the research. One candidate for 
such a limiting factor might be the ability to “switch gears” from reasoning about 
intentional actions to reasoning about unintentional actions. The order of the two trial 
types was randomized, so children did not know before any given question whether the 
action would be on purpose or not. After learning the intentionality of the action, 
participants had to change their mode of reasoning quickly, from one type of action, 
causality and explanation to the other. Although this processing variable seems as if it 
would improve during the preschool years, perhaps the time course of this ability’s  
development is on a larger scale, such that improvement can be detected over many years 
instead of from one year to the next. 
Alternatively, perhaps the 5- and 6-year-olds were already at adult levels for this 
particular study. As I will discuss in the following section, even adults tend to have a 
natural bias toward “psychologizing” actions, assuming purposefulness and reason 
explanations when in doubt or when the issue is not being considered.  
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Reasoning about intentional and unintentional actions 
Recall that in Experiment 2, in which children chose explanations for actions 
featured in the stories, there were two trial types differing by whether the experimenter 
announced that the action in the story was on purpose or not on purpose. Although both 
types of trial were designed to assess the general ability to match the intentionality of 
actions with appropriate explanation types, children performed better when they reasoned 
about the “on purpose” items than when they reasoned about the “not on purpose” items, 
even though across participants the same stories were used for both trial types. In other 
words, children were more likely to err by choosing reasons for unintentional actions than 
by choosing causes for intentional actions.  
This finding suggests that the children were biased toward explaining behavior in 
terms of desires and / or beliefs, even when the experimenter clearly stated that the action 
was not performed on purpose. Whereas other studies had demonstrated that children are 
capable of explaining different types of behavior using different modes of causality, to 
my knowledge this is the first study directly comparing children’s explanations for 
intentional actions with those for unintentional actions such that one can see whether 
mistakes in explanations were distributed evenly between the two types of action, or 
whether explanations overall tended toward either reasons or causes.  
Is this finding consistent with the results of the other research reviewed here? 
Indeed, a few of the studies discussed earlier are suggestive of such an intentional bias. 
First, McCabe and Peterson (2001), as well as Hood and Bloom (1979), found that in 
natural speech 2- through 6-year-olds generally talk more about mental causality than 
about physical causality, indicating that young children gain more experience with the 
latter type of causality than the former, and perhaps also that young children tend to focus 
on the social world, with its characteristic mode of causality, more than on the physical 
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world. In addition, in Smith’s study (1984) 4-year-olds looking at both intentional and 
unintentional videotaped actions consistently responded that the actions were on purpose, 
seeming to reveal a default strategy of assuming intentionality when one is in doubt or 
when one does not give the decision much consideration.  
In fact, even Malle’s (1999) adult participants seemed to be biased toward  
judging actions to be intentional. In Study 2, when they judged the intentionality of 
actions based on given explanations, they did in fact conform to Malle’s general model of 
behavior in that their average intentionality ratings for actions explained with reasons was 
higher than the average intentionality ratings for actions explained with causes. However, 
whereas the mean of their intentionality ratings for actions explained with causes was 8.1, 
which was close to maximally intentional, the mean of their intentionality ratings for 
actions explained with causes was 4.1, which is relatively closer to causal ambiguity. In 
other words, even though the actions were meant to be causally ambiguous, and each was 
explained with a cause for half the participants and with a reason for the other half, adults 
tended to avoid judging actions to be clearly unintentional. It is not possible to 
statistically evaluate this claim, as Malle neither analyzed nor discussed the issue. 
Another, less interesting possibility regarding the discrepancy between intentional 
and unintentional trials in Experiment 2 of the present research is that children find it 
more difficult to reason about actions described in terms of a negation (i.e., “didn’t  mean 
to,” “didn’t do it on purpose”) than actions described in simple, positive terms (i.e., 
“meant to,”  “did it on purpose).” However, in a series of studies in which children were 
required to make dichotomous decisions about whether actions were “magic” or “not 
magic,” Woolley and I found that even children who had just turned three were as likely 
to say that the items were not magic as they were to say that they were magic (Browne & 
Woolley, 2004). Also, the fact that the discrepancy between trial types in the present 
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research corroborates other research findings in which people seem to resist construing 
actions as entirely unintentional (e.g., Hood & Bloom, 1979; Malle, 1999; McCabe & 
Peterson, 2001; Smith, 1984) argues for the interpretation that people’s construals of the 
intentionality of actions are made against a tacit background assumption that most actions 
are on purpose or generated by mental states.  
This “bias” toward seeing actions as intentional or as able to be explained using 
reasons is not altogether surprising, as everyday experience suggests that we as people 
are more focused on and interested in actions that reflect something about the mental 
states of the actors than actions that reflect non-intentional forces. In Smith’s words 
(1984) we tend to “cognize the behavior stream” in terms of a series of intentional actions 
(p. 736). It seems that in order to do this one needs to ignore physical details of how the 
actions are carried out (something Fune could not do, Borges, 1967), many of those 
insignificant-seeming details being unintended movements or actions. 
A possible factor contributing to this intentional bias is that we tend to think of 
our “selves,” or our identities, as being something other than our bodies. Bloom (2004), 
for example, following DesCartes, argued that we tend to identify with ourselves 
primarily as incorporeal beings who are contained in our bodies or who possess our 
bodies, indicating that on some level, regardless of our religious beliefs, we think there is 
a self (or soul, or mind) that is at least theoretically separable, or even separate, from our 
physical manifestations.  
This attitude is evident when we say “use your brain,” as if the brain were 
something that we use as a tool, like a calculator, or when people debate about whether 
some mental illness is a “physical” disease, as if there could be any mental state, mental 
dysfunction, or mental event that was not inextricably tied to corresponding “events” in 
the physical brain. This intimate identification with the mental, or psychological, self as 
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an autonomous being apart from the body might lead us to discount or fail to 
acknowledge some of the unintentional actions performed by our bodies (not by our 
“selves”!) without mediation of the will.  
In other words, perhaps our intuitive dualism leads us to feel more comfortable 
explaining our own and other people’s behavior in terms of our mental states (which are 
closely identified with the “self”) than in terms of mechanical forces (that in most cases 
directly affect the body, which is less identified with the self). Although people do not 
seem to have much practical trouble explaining unintentional actions with reference to 
physical forces, we might feel slightly uncomfortable viewing ourselves or other people 
as conforming to the same laws as other physical objects such as billiard balls and 
planets.  This special focus on intentional behavior could lead people to deal with 
ambiguous cases by erring in the direction of intentionality and purpose, thereby coming 
up with “false positives.”  
It should be noted that this bias does not contradict Malle’s claim that we tend to 
view intentional actions as being caused by the actor’s mental states and unintentional 
actions as being caused by direct, non-mental forces. The claim is simply that intentional 
actions gain more attention from us than unintentional ones, and that there is a slight bias 
to interpret actions intentionally. After all, the model is supposed to describe a cognitive, 
behavioral, and perhaps emotional tendency, not an invariable or inevitable pattern. 
In light of this discussion of some of the cognitive-emotional factors involved in 
explaining behavior, perhaps Carey and Spelke’s (1994) “entity view” of how we decide 
what type of causality to refer to in our explanations is not entirely incorrect. A 
hypothetical strong version of the view, claiming that type of causality is necessarily 
linked to the entity being explained (e.g., mental causality for people, physical causality 
for computers) has been disproved by several studies showing children’s and adults’ 
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flexibility in explaining human action (e.g., the present research; Kalish (1998); Malle, 
1999; Schult & Wellman, 1997). Again, however, the present findings (that children 
seem to err on the side of “over-psychologizing” human behavior), along with similar 
findings from other studies such as those previously mentioned and our intuitive views 
about our selves and our bodies, suggest that we do have a natural tendency to explain 
human behavior in terms of mental states. The extent of the naturalness and flexibility of 
attributing the movement or “behavior” of inanimate objects to mechanical causality is 
beyond the scope of this research, but I would not be surprised if it turned out that both 
children and adults tended to explain the behavior of “intelligent” objects such as 
computers in terms of its desires and even its beliefs (e.g., “It’s trying to open the 
program but it thinks I’m still using the other one.”) 
The nature of the ability to explain and interpret human behavior 
In Experiment 2, not only was performance on the intentional trials better than 
that on the unintentional trials, but performance on the two trial types did not correlate. 
Together these findings lead to the question of whether the ability to explain actions 
based on their intentionality consists of a unified set of rules or relations or of two 
different “modes” of reasoning or knowledge appropriated for the task. 
Traditional, domain-general views of cognitive development, adult cognition, and 
attribution theory would maintain that the ability to explain human behavior gradually 
improves through social experience and the development of general reasoning skills. 
However, more recent theory within psychology would suggest a different view. 
In the last fifteen years or so, the idea that the nature and development of our 
knowledge, thought processes and development are at least partially domain specific has 
garnered increased attention. According to the domain-specific view of cognition and 
development, learning takes place within several distinct systems of knowledge, each 
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with its own ontology and causal laws. Two of the most commonly cited candidates for 
domains are basic knowledge about people’s mental states and behavior (“intuitive 
psychology”) and basic knowledge about physical objects (“intuitive physics”). (For a 
thorough discussion of the domain specificity view, see the chapters in Hirschfeld & 
Gelman, 1994.) 
Consistent with the domain specificity view of cognition and cognitive 
development is the proposal that the task of explaining human behavior, although it is a 
crucially important, ubiquitous, and almost effortless skill, is best conceived as consisting 
of two separate modes of reasoning. Under this view, we decide whether or to what 
extent a behavior is intentional and come up with an explanation for it by consulting and 
coordinating two of our main knowledge domains, intuitive psychology and intuitive 
physics. These, of course, correspond to intentional and unintentional action. 
The finding from the present research that reasoning about intentional and 
unintentional actions were uncorrelated and that the former tended to lag behind the latter 
throughout the preschool years, is consistent with this domain specific view of the 
development and nature of explaining human behavior (as well as with the dualistic sense 
of self, as described earlier). A goal of future research on this issue might be to devise 
ways to address empirically the domain-specificity versus domain-general view of 
explaining behavior empirically. 
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CONCLUSION  
The research in this dissertation begins to explore the development of the ability 
to explain human behavior based on the intentionality of actions, and, conversely, the 
ability to infer the intentionality of actions based on their explanations. As well as 
providing straightforward evidence that on average this double-barreled ability begins to 
appear near children’s fifth birthday, the findings raise several other questions.  
First, is the ability to infer the intentionality of action, given an explanation, more 
or less difficult than the reverse? Although the results from this research suggest that 
children find it more difficult to explain actions given their intentionality than the reverse, 
the research design did not provide the opportunity to address this question directly 
because among other reasons the two studies had different numbers of participants. 
However, the question could be addressed by designing the two studies to be as parallel 
as possible.    
The findings also raise the question of whether inferring the intentionality of 
actions given explanations improves more throughout the preschool years than does the 
reverse ability. Again, the results of these studies suggest that this proposal might be true, 
but the evidence is not conclusive and further research is warranted. 
Another question, resulting from the data indicating that children’s views of 
intentionality almost always involve negative outcomes, concerns the role of the context 
in which the on purpose / not on purpose dichotomy is used in natural settings. As stated 
earlier, many parents said that their children use the purpose / accident distinction in 
order to blame a sibling or friend, or to exonerate themselves, for an act with negative 
consequences. It would be interesting to replicate the present studies substituting actions 
with negative outcomes for the ones with neutral outcomes. Such a change might lead 
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experimenters to find the ability addressed in this research appearing at an earlier age 
than seen here.   
Finally, it would also be useful to come up with other ways to directly compare 
reasoning about intentional actions with that about unintentional actions. The data here 
are consistent with the proposals that children and adults are biased towards construing 
human action as being intentional, as well as that each type of reasoning represents a 
separate process. However, these are broad claims and much more research is needed to 
verify them.  
In conclusion, the research in this dissertation, addressing children’s knowledge 
of the relation between the intentionality of actions and their causal explanations, speaks 
to issues in several broad areas and themes in psychology. These include cognitive 
development, adult cognition, social cognition, the nature and organization of knowledge, 
and even the role of emotion and metaphysical beliefs in the construal of events and 
behavior. Clearly no single set of experiments can tackle this multi-faceted issue all at 
once. In fact, this issue might find a prominent place among the many fascinating and 
frustrating topics of debate in psychology for years to come. It will be in good company. 
 75
Appendix 





Intentional: Here’s Jack. Jack was playing at the jungle gym, hanging from a bar. Then he dropped 
down from the bar. He dropped from the bar because he wanted to go play on the swing.  
Unintentional: Here’s Henry. Henry was playing at the jungle gym too, hanging from a bar too. 
Then he dropped down from the bar. He dropped from the bar because his hands slipped off the bar.  
Experiment 2 
 Here’s Matt. Matt was playing at the jungle gym, hanging from a bar. Then he dropped down 





Intentional: Here’s Alicia. She was playing with some blocks and she made a tower. Then, she 
knocked over the tower. She knocked over the tower because she tripped on it.  
Unintentional: Here’s Mary. She was playing with some blocks too, and she made a tower. Then, 
she knocked over the tower. She knocked it over because she wanted to build something else.  
Experiment 2 
 This is Tamara. She was playing with some blocks and she made a tower. Then, she knocked over 






Intentional: This is Sally. She was at a birthday party, and someone gave her a balloon. Then, she 
popped the balloon. She popped the balloon because she wanted to hear the popping sound. 
Unintentional: This is Theresa. She was at a birthday party, and someone gave her a balloon. 
Then, she popped the balloon. She popped the balloon because she dropped it on something sharp. 
Experiment 2 
This is Casey. She was at a birthday party, and someone gave her a balloon. Then, she popped the 





Intentional: This is Max. He was outside and he had cracker crumbs in his hand. Then, he dropped 
the crumbs onto the ground. He dropped the crumbs because he thought the birds would like them. 
Unintentional: This is George. He was outside and he had cracker crumbs in his hand. Then, he 
dropped the crumbs onto the ground. He dropped the crumbs because they fell out of his hand. 
Experiment 2 
This is Matt. He was outside and he had cracker crumbs in his hand. Then, he dropped the crumbs 








Intentional: This is Joanne. She was walking in the woods at night, and she jumped. She jumped 
because she wanted to get over a log. 
Unintentional: This is Lisa. She was walking in the woods at night, and she jumped. She jumped 
because something scared her. 
Experiment 2 
This is Hillary. She was walking in the woods at night, and she jumped. She meant to jump; she 
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